Debates centered round regions and regionalism and the sharpened awareness of the possibilities of regional cooperation and institution building emerged in the post Cold War era. Three central elements have been identified by analysts as constituting the core elements of regionalism. First, a common historical experience and a sense of shared problems among a geographically distinct group of states/societies which constituted a region. Second, close linkages of a distinct kind between those states/societies, in other words recognition of a boundary to the region within which interactions would be more intense than those with the outside world, in other words, regionalisation. Finally, the emergence of an organisation giving shape to the region in a legal and institutional sense and providing rules of the game within the region, the element of conscious policy which is central to regionalism. [1] Therefore, while dealing with regionalism, three elements emerge as important. The first relates to the spatial dimension of regionalism, i.e., how large is the area covered and how is the area defined or redefined as conditions change. A second relates to its scope; in other words the tasks or areas of interaction covered by the region or by the regional organisation. A third feature is the level and extent of the organisation. [2] These three are useful since they indicate the variety and unevenness of regionalism. They also bring into focus the fact that regional organisations recognise boundaries both in terms of spatial dimension as well as in terms of scope.
The acceptance of these three as crucial brings into focus the fundamental question about the nature of the SCO, its aims and objectives. What was the SCO visualised to be — a regional security group, a trade bloc or something else? And more importantly how has it developed over the years? In any case, there is need to analyse whether the SCO was visualised as a ‘regional’ organisation and the way in which its region was defined. In the 1990’s the SCO had a clear criterion for membership — states that share a border with China. The Shanghai Forum was formed to deal with the requirements of confidence building measures at the borders of the states and resolve border disputes. As a ‘regional’ bloc it then defined itself as China and its immediate neighbourhood to its west. If we accept this to be the SCO region then its optimal permanent membership would be what it is today (though Uzbekistan does not share a boundary with China) with the possible inclusion of Turkmenistan. However, most ‘regional’ organisations expand and this expansion is generally related to the way in which their role is subsequently visualised. The SCO expanded with the inclusion of three categories of membership, observers, dialogue partners and guests. Mongolia, India, Pakistan and Iran were accepted as observers. Given the significance of Afghanistan to the regional security balance it has been accepted as guest. A looser form of affiliation has been introduced with the introduction of the category of dialogue partner. The initial choice of Belarus and Sri Lanka as dialogue partners demonstrates this to be the new less restrictive category which would enable the organisation to expand its geographical reach into Europe and South Asia, thus redefining the concept of the SCO region. Subsequently Turkey was accepted as a dialogue partner and more recently there has been agreement on acceptance of Belarus as observer and Azerbaijan, Armenia, Cambodia and Nepal as dialogue partners. By looking beyond traditional partners, the SCO emphasised a readiness to respond to emerging complementarities and new avenues of cooperation. [3] This is a significant development and a distinct change from the immediate priories of the organisation when it was first conceived. It is, however, the inclusion of India and Pakistan as permanent members of the SCO that has raised the largest number of issues and most significantly the question whether ‘good neighbourly partnership’ would remain the principal focus of the organisation. It is in this context that the 16th SCO Summit assumes significance.
The debate on inclusion
The 16th SCO Summit scheduled to be held in Tashkent, Uzbekistan on 23 to 24 June 2016 is expected to finally conclude the process of inclusion of India as a permanent member in the SCO. However, even before the beginning of the Summit, reports have tended to argue that the process of inclusion may not be the foregone conclusion that it is being assumed to be and that in any case the level of engagement that India would be offered within the organisation would be determined by existing members. At the Summit in Ufa (Russia) on 10 July 2015, Putin announced that the organisation was turning a “new page as the process of including Pakistan and India is being launched”. More significantly, the members reiterated their willingness to create a Development Bank and Development Fund and supported China’s proposal to create a Silk Road Economic Belt across the SCO member states. The SCO Summit which followed the BRICS Summit underlined the importance of stability in Afghanistan with the withdrawal of international forces. [4] Post Ufa, a debate initiated among strategic experts on Russia, China, India and the Central Asian states on the implications of inclusion of India and Pakistan’s in the SCO indicated that the acceptance of the two South Asian states within the SCO was far from resolved. [5] Sanat Kushkumbayev, Deputy Director of the Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan was quoted as saying, “The start of India and Pakistan’s accession to the SCO was top of the agenda, but de jure the process has yet to be fully clarified. It is quite possible that an existing SCO member could block their entry”. Uzbek President Islam Karimov noted that the entry of India and Pakistan could change the balance of power inside the organisation and internationally. There remain a number of unresolved issues between India and Pakistan and how these would affect the SCO was unclear and Uzbek analyst Farkhad Tolipov seemed to be in agreement. There was general agreement that for China the SCO was now no longer crucial. It was the One Belt One Road, an infrastructural project with its own funding agency the AIIB that had become important for China. On the other hand the need for Chinese and Indian investment in infrastructural development seemed to be the motivating factor for the acceptance of the expanded membership among the Central Asian states. There is also the need to keep in mind the fact that there is disagreement among SCO members about certain issues like the level of involvement in Afghanistan. Russian President Putin supports increased involvement of the SCO in Afghanistan whereas Uzbek President Karimov defines Afghanistan as a “smouldering war with no end in sight” and argues that for the SCO to get involved it would mean assuming responsibility for Afghanistan something that would be assumed not just by the Afghans, but the entire world. He argues that the SCO needs to focus on long term interests, principally economic issues and increasing bilateral trade and investment. [6]
How far the issue of India’s SCO membership figured during the Russia-India-China (the RIC format is the core for the larger BRICS) foreign minister level meeting in Moscow on April 18, 2016 is also unclear. The joint communiqué issued after the RIC meeting noted:
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