Showing posts with label Wassennar Arrangement. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Wassennar Arrangement. Show all posts

Thursday, 30 March 2017

Chinese regional hegemony is a bridge too far

Chinese Hegemony
The National Intelligence Council (NIC) of the United States released its Global Trends report last month. Titled Paradox of Progress, it warns its readers to buckle themselves for an increasingly turbulent future. Much of this turbulence, it argues, would emanate from a phenomenon the world has not seen in at least since the end of the Cold War: hegemonic struggles among major powers. The decline of American power, according to the NIC, is one of the main reasons for such grim prognostication. But so is the possibility of China replacing the US hegemony. In short, the report appears to confirm an already existing impression: that the global liberal order, largely a product of post-Second World War US power, may be short-lived. The most likely casualty of this power shift would be the US hegemony in the Indo-Pacific.
The decline of the US power is arguably manifesting itself in the current inward trend in US foreign policy. The US now intends to tamper down on its commitments to its allies in the Asia-Pacific and is actively encouraging them to bear most of the burden of their alliance commitments. Rather than an active balancer of Chinese power in the Indo-Pacific, the US appears to be moving to a posture of off-shore balancing. Neo-isolationist tendencies in American body politic may further entrench China’s hegemonic role in the region, analysts fear.
Despite a grim perception of a decline in the US power in Asia and China’s rise, it is not readily evident that the regional order in the Indo-Pacific will witness a Chinese hegemony. To achieve regional hegemony, three conditions are necessary. First, a regional hegemon has to effectively control not only the continental sphere of influence but also the maritime domain. Second, regional hegemony requires all possible rivals to be neutralised. Lastly, hegemony must exude a benign character since the difference between hegemony and raw power is one of legitimacy. China falls short in all these categories.
China by its nature has always been a continental power. It is hemmed in by land frontiers from three directions. Some of these are disputed, for example the India-China border. In Central Asia, its intentions to expand its sphere of influence contests with those of Russia. Even when China has pacified most of its territorial disputes, the contestations on the continental front are still active. Moreover, China’s growing dominance in the continental sphere notwithstanding, its maritime frontiers remain far from stable. . China’s maritime presence is restricted by geography itself. Its access to the Pacific Ocean is blocked by a ring of hostile Island Chains. The presence of states such as Taiwan, Philippines, and Japan are natural obstacles to China’s maritime influence. Its access to the Indian Ocean is similarly imperilled by the tyranny of geography especially its Malacca dilemma. However, the real problem for China is the presence of the US Navy and its unparalleled control over Asia-Pacific’s maritime domain. China’s sea denial capabilities in the form of a substantive submarine fleet and anti-access missiles are largely defensive systems which add little to its ability to project power. As David Shambaugh argues, “Chinese military forces still possess no conventional global power-projection capabilities.”  Projection of power demands sea control capabilities: a large fleet of aircraft carriers. With its first aircraft carrier still under development, that is a prospect which will require substantial effort and time. It will also lead to employment of asymmetric warfare against its own sea control assets, as is currently the Chinese strategy towards the US Navy. And even when US may decide to gradually move out of the Indo-Pacific, a remote possibility indeed, China will have to contend other equally capable navies especially with Japan in East Asia and India in the Indian Ocean. China’s prospects of dominating the Asia-Pacific’s maritime domain are therefore bleak. And if the history of great power rivalries has anything to offer for contemporary analysis, no continental power can be a regional hegemon without establishing an absolute control over the maritime domain. That Beijing realises its maritime vulnerability is evident in China’s frantic attempts to get access to the Indian Ocean through land corridors and naval bases, success of which many argue is doomed to failure.
Second, continental powers generate much more friction than maritime powers do. As Edward Luttwak explains in the Logic of Strategy, the rise of Chinese power will automatically generate countervailing balances. Unlike maritime powers which tend to control the oceans and have limited capacity to pursue territorial aggression, continental powers are perceived to be more hostile due to their capability to pursue territorial harm. Balances of power are more frequently achieved against continental powers as against maritime powers. The case of Germany in both First and Second World War is a case in point. But so was the case of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. China’s maritime disputes with most of its neighbours add to this explosive mix. When seen holistically, China’s rise in the region has led to an increase in balancing activity by other states in the region whether big or small. From India to Japan and Vietnam, the region is witnessing a rise in both internal balancing (increasing military expenditures) but also external balancing. The latter is particularly relevant in the strategic interactions between India, Japan, Australia, Singapore, Vietnam and the US. In the Indo-Pacific, China is increasingly been seen as a hostile power, one that might also remain “lonely”.
If China cannot possibly overcome its continental character to transform into a dominant maritime power and its rise would continue to generate more friction with other states, it’s most difficult internal challenge would be to provide a veneer of legitimacy to its growing power. The US hegemony led to the creation of a liberal global order which benefited most states to some extent. The rise of China in the last quarter of a century could not have been possible without the US-led liberal order. Even if the US hegemony was contested in certain quarters, it was also widely accepted because the US could externalise the benefits of its hegemony to other stakeholders, be it through commerce, institutions, rules and norms. China’s message of harmonious development and peaceful rise was a similar attempt to make its rise more acceptable to the broader Indo-Pacific. But China’s behaviour in recent years has, rather than creating additional legitimacy for itself, made other states more anxious. China’s insulated domestic politics is one reason for this anxiety. Unlike democratic powers, lack of transparency in China’s internal politics creates uncertainty about its intentions. This is most obvious in the debate over China’s military spending. China’s one-party rule does not allow any kind of external influence on its domestic policy. It has been suggested by some that the US hegemony was benign particularly because its domestic politics was always influenced by interest-groups representing many ethnicities and nationalities. In China, such external influences are not possible. Finally, if China was to be the regional growth-engine, recent trends suggest that China may not be able to externalise even the economic benefits in the region. The process of de-globalisation will force China to adopt similar neo-mercantilist economic policies. It has already started transforming its export-oriented economy into one which is sustained by internal consumption. For many of Asia’s smaller economies, penetrating Chinese markets therefore would be an increasingly burdensome exercise.
Notwithstanding NIC’s emphasis on the emerging disorder in the region and beyond, Chinese hegemony in the Indo-Pacific appears to be some way off. One may not dispute the decline in American power and more so its willingness to engage in the region, but to suggest that China will automatically replace United States as the regional hegemon is far-fetched. The current strategic flux surely does make the region and the globe more chaotic but it also offers opportunities to other rising powers like India. For one, it provides India greater strategic space which if used judiciously may help in extracting concessions from the Chinese. If history is any guide to Chinese behaviour, the alignment of international politics has always been a major determinant of Chinese behaviour vis-a-vis New Delhi. For example, after the Sino-Soviet clashes of March 1969, India and China began their first dialogue after the 1962 war. By using China’s sensitivity over its perceived vulnerability in a hegemonic contest with the US, India may profit from this strategic flux. It will also allow her to increase its position in the Indo-Pacific’s new regional order and to create substantive partnerships with countries like Japan and South Korea which New Delhi needs for its own economic development. Finally, any rising power like India needs regional followers. As China’s power increases and perceptions of American decline get further entrenched in the region, India’s efforts to mediate and stand for a liberal regional order may increase its influence especially with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. Increasing uncertainty, as the NIC report suggests, brings disorder but such situations also raise the value of key swing states like India. For rising powers, some disorder is also a virtue.

South China Sea | Vol. VI, Issue 3

THE ISSUE: China announces observation platforms in the South China Sea

 Adding to the already existing number of constructions, Beijing announced that it is in the process of building an underwater observation platform in the South China Sea. The platform will serve as an observation station for studying underwater conditions in real time and will be built with the help of Tongji University and the Institute of Acoustics. The announcement came in late February and close on the heels of another declaration that the country plans to develop floating nuclear power plants in the South China Sea. The purpose of the plants will be to supply electricity to islands in the region, especially to the offshore projects being established by China and to benefit oil and gas exploration.
The China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) has informed that the country plans to develop 20 such nuclear plants, which are expected to begin operations around 2019, to boost both power and water supplies. The platforms are also expected to facilitate power supply in times of emergency and natural disasters. China started building its first floating nuclear power reactor in November last year. The underwater observation platform, which will be the first of its kind, will explore undersea physical, chemical, and geological dynamics along with being directed at other purposes. It is not very clear what these other purposes might be.
Constructions being built by China on the islands and reefs that dot the South China Sea have the subject of deliberations over the last few years. They have drawn attention primarily for three reasons. First, these constructions which include artificial islands and air strips besides the platforms announced in February are located in maritime territory that is disputed with competing sovereignty claims made by China and littoral countries like Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia among others. Second, the nature and objective of the constructions is of concern among countries in the Asia-Pacific region which many suspecting that military and naval utilization by China cannot be ruled out.  The third reason is the pace at which China seems to be developing the constructions. While the reefs, atolls and waters of the South China Sea have been disputed for years, it is only recently that Beijing has begun to ‘reclaim’ the physical space of the region.
China is increasingly and intensely feeling the pressures of rising energy needs along with what gradually appears to be a slowing economic growth. The developments being pursued by China in its immediate maritime space can be understood as the country’s response to the need for meeting its energy demands and also giving a fillip to the economy. What is interesting for observers and disconcerting for those concerned is the ambit that China regards as its sovereign space. Having refused to acknowledge the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in July last year, Beijing’s insistence and interpretation of what constitutes as its sovereign territory and its denial of international law and dispute resolution measures have contributed to both ambiguity and apprehension regarding the objectives behind its actions in the South China Sea.

MEDIA WATCH

China to build first underwater platform in South China Sea

China will build its first long-term underwater observation platform in resource-rich South China Sea, where it has territorial disputes with many south-east Asian countries including Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. The platform aims to observe underwater conditions in real time. “Construction work on the long-term observation platform covering key areas in the South China and East China seas will be done with the help of Shanghai’s Tongji University and the Institute of Acoustics,” Wang Pinxian, an academic at the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) said.

Indonesia to raise prospect of joint patrols with Australia in South China Sea

Indonesia President Joko Widodo will discuss the prospect of joint patrols with Australia in the South China Sea when he meets his counterpart Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull at the weekend. Widodo said he would like to see joint patrols with Australia, but only if did not further inflame tensions with China. Indonesia has traditionally taken a neutral position on the South China Sea, acting as a buffer between China and fellow members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that have the most at stake, the Philippines and Vietnam.
Source: (Reuters)

China urges US to contribute to peace in South China Sea

China said on Tuesday that it hoped the United States would do what is good to the peace and stability in the South China Sea as a U.S. aircraft carrier strike group began patrolling the region. “China always respects the freedom of navigation and overflight of all countries in the South China Sea in accordance with international law, but we oppose those who threaten and harm the sovereignty and security of coastal countries under the pretext of freedom of navigation and overflight,” said Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang at the daily press briefing.
Source: (Xinhua)

ASEAN ministers call for continuous South China Sea dialogue

Foreign ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) noted the importance of sustaining the momentum of dialogue in easing the tensions in the disputed South China Sea, the Philippines’ top diplomat said on Tuesday. Foreign Affairs Secretary Perfecto Yasay Jr. said that a number of his counterparts expressed concern over the possible militarization of some areas in the region during the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat in Boracay. The foreign ministers affirmed the importance of pursuing peaceful resolution of disputes without resorting to use of force and in accordance with the international law including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Source: (Philstar)

China wraps up exercise with three warships in South China Sea

Three Chinese warships on Friday wrapped up a week of scheduled training exercises in the South China Sea, shortly after China’s sole aircraft carrier tested its weapons in the disputed region. The flotilla of warships, including a destroyer that can launch guided missiles, had been conducting drills since Friday last week and were now sailing to the eastern India Ocean and the Western Pacific. The training included sudden attack drills and had been carried out successfully in poor sea conditions.
Source:(Economic Times)

Japan to speed up frigate build to reinforce East China Sea

Japan plans to accelerate a warship building program to make two frigates a year to patrol the fringes of the East China Sea, where it disputes island ownership with China, three people with knowledge of the plan said. Japan previously was building one 5,000-ton class destroyer a year, but will now make two 3,000-ton class ships a year, beginning from the April 2018 fiscal year, the people said, declining to be identified as they are not authorized to talk to the media. It aims to produce a fleet of eight of the new class of smaller, cheaper vessels, which may also have mine-sweeping and anti-submarine capability.
Source: (Reuters)

China plans to build floating nuclear plants in South China Sea

China has said it will develop floating nuclear power plants on a priority basis in the South China Sea as it seeks to beef up electricity supply to the islands in the disputed maritime region. China will prioritise the development of a floating nuclear power platform in the coming five years, in an effort to provide stable power to offshore projects and promote ocean gas exploitation. The development of the facility is a crucial part of the country’s five-year economic development plan, running through 2020.

China Weekly Report | Vol. VII Issue 9

Roundup of the latest developments on China.

0How important is Latin America on China’s foreign policy agenda?

In light of President Xi Jinping’s visit to South American nations of Ecuador, Peru, and Chile, it’s important to ask: how important is Latin America to China’s foreign policy agenda. Read more >


1The SCO Bank should wake India up to the strategic consequences of Chinese capital

Through the proposed creation of the SCO Bank, China has sought to tie its underwriting of economic development in the Eurasian landmass with its strategic goals for the region. Read more >


6Xi Jinping anointed “core” Chinese leader, but his strategy reveals a contradiction

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s penchant for collecting titles is well known. Is his compulsive habit of consolidating control over byzantine organs of the Chinese state in his own hands? Read more >


2Europe warms up to China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ project, raising the stakes for India

OBOR is not a connectivity project, but an arrangement intended to maximise China’s exports, and help Beijing move up the global value chain. Read more >


3What Duterte’s comments mean for the South China Sea dispute, and the Indian position

Were China to continue obstructing India’s entry into the NSG, or tighten its strategic embrace of Pakistan, it is likely India will sharpen its tone on the SCS dispute as well. Read more >


4India needs to find other ways to deal with China

China will continue to push against India seeing the India-US equation and India’s Act East policy as adverse. Read more >


5Paradiplomacy: Can India learn from Macau and China?

Paradiplomacy forms not just a quintessential part of the country’s foreign policy analysis. Read more >


7Should China cozying up to Bangladesh worry India?

India is worried about the bonhomie with Bangladesh, largely due to perception that China’s motivation to engage with India’s neighbour is to pursue its 

The SCO Bank should wake India up to the strategic consequences of Chinese capital

SCO Bank should be flagged as a competitor to India-led initiatives like BRICS Bank, which may undermine New Delhi’s role as an economic power in the region.
Beijing, November 2016: At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s (SCO) heads of government meet this week in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, China formally proposed the creation of an SCO Bank to promote development and “boost financial cooperation.” The proposal, accepted by the six member group, is significant for three reasons:
First, unlike other financing initiatives in the region where China is involved, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is a security oriented bloc. The Chinese proposal  is interesting because SCO countries are all founding members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as well, raising questions about the additional purpose that the SCO Bank presumably serves. It is unlikely the SCO Bank’s management or lending rates will be any different. But in comparison to the AIIB, Beijing would have considerable flexibility in determining what projects the SCO should fund, thanks to its dominance of the group. Through its proposed creation of the SCO Bank, China has sought to tie its underwriting of economic development in the Eurasian landmass with its strategic goals for the region. The SCO is not ASEAN, but the bloc shares a considerable degree of political and military consensus that would aid the SCO Bank’s decision making process.

Through its proposed creation of the SCO Bank, China has sought to tie its underwriting of economic development in the Eurasian landmass with its strategic goals for the region.

Second, the SCO Bank could quickly emerge as a competitor to the BRICS New Development Bank, given Russia’s immediate interests in its neighbourhood. Pakistan, absent from the BRICS grouping, may attempt to steer infrastructure development through the SCO, sensing an opportunity to participate in regional projects (say, through an extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor). India, along with Pakistan, will join the bloc formally in 2017 but New Delhi would at best be a junior partner in SCO projects, as opposed to the stature it enjoys in the BRICS grouping.
Third, Beijing has made it clear there is “synergy” between the Belt and Road project (OBOR) and the Eurasian Economic Union, and the SCO Bank may be a carrot for Central Asian states that have so far stayed away to sign up to OBOR. Moreover, Moscow had already agreed to formally link OBOR to the EEU. The prospect of the SCO Bank becoming a conduit for Russia-China efforts to jointly project economic power in the EEU will ring alarm bells in Western capitals.

What does it mean for India?

The SCO Bank is another reminder that New Delhi should be sensitive to the strategic consequences of Chinese capital investments in Asia. Political influence that accrues as a result of bilateral investment is only one such consequence. If anything, recent attempts by China to gain clout in Maldives, Sri Lanka and Nepal by investing in massive infrastructure projects have shown the limits of this approach. But, entities like the SCO Bank give Beijing room to link project financing with its Silk Route project, and determine the economic outlook of the region. This is perhaps of most concern to India, given that its service-oriented businesses are competitive at the higher end of the supply chain. Were projects like OBOR or the SCO Bank result in captive markets in Central and South East Asia for Beijing, it will be easy for Chinese companies to move up the supply chain once the base infrastructure has been put in place. At that stage, it may be difficult for Indian businesses to influence investment guidelines, industry norms or standards as they relate to the provision of services.

The Alibaba example

A good example is Alibaba, China’s top e-commerce company. Even as Huawei looks to be the dominant supplier of telecom and ICT infrastructure in the region, Alibaba will likely expand its footprint in Russia and Eurasia this decade. It is conceivable that Alipay, Alibaba’s payment portal, will be promoted as a fast and efficient way of transacting on the internet — after all, the logistics chain would have been set up by China, and most vendors will be comfortable with a Chinese payment gateway. Would Indian vendors, and innovators in financial technology be crowded out of the market as a result? Would China’s dominance of ‘fintech’ systems also allow it to mould encryption and data protection norms in the region? Will Indian services that rely on retail outsourcing find that some markets in Asia have been closed to them even before they enter it?
Alibaba, China, ecommerce, legitimacy, market return, reconcile, reality, trajectory, growth
Courtesy: Alibaba.com via Twitter
These dire outcomes need not come to pass, but Indian policy planners should be mindful of the potential impact of strategic Chinese investments. The SCO Bank should also be flagged as a competitor to India-led or involved initiatives like the BRICS Bank, which may undermine New Delhi’s role as a economic power in the region. This is not say India should stay away from the SCO Bank. Certain realities remain unchanged: China has plenty of money to pass around; Pakistan will attempt to court Beijing as a site for potential investment; and the Russia-China axis will grow stronger in the years to come. India gets little by staying out of the game. Beijing is certainly keen, both for the sake of legitimacy and for sound market returns, to invest in India. Whether those investments should be coupled with a China-India partnership on larger economic projects is for both capitals to decide. India may have to reconcile with the reality that it will not be an equal partner to Beijing in the design of certain infrastructure projects, but there is no alternative to engagement. By staying out of Chinese-led regional initiatives, India loses a crucial opportunity to secure the future of its own businesses and projects in Asia, and indeed, determine the trajectory of growth.
This is the final of the three part series on China’s foreign policy and what its evolution means for India.

China Weekly Report | Vol. VII Issue 5

POLITICS & SOCIETY

China invites journalists to cover political meetings

Invitations have been sent out to journalists from China and abroad to cover two major Chinese political meetings next month.  The fifth annual session of the 12th National People’s Congress (NPC), the country’s top legislature, will open on March 5 in Beijing.  The fifth session of the 12th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the top political advisory body, will open on March 3. A media center for the two meetings will be open from Feb 27, the general offices of the NPC Standing Committee and the CPPCC National Committee announced. Chinese and foreign journalists should submit applications for passes to the media center, while foreign reporters temporarily in China for the “two sessions” should apply to Chinese embassies or visa organizations authorized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Reporters from Hong Kong and Macao should apply at the central government’s liaison offices in the two special administrative regions. Reporters from Taiwan should apply to the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office.
Source: China Daily

Government helps 3.7m workers get unpaid wages

The government helped more than 3.7 million migrant workers get their unpaid wages totaling more than 35 billion yuan ($5.1 billion) last year. However, the long-standing problem of migrant workers failing to get paid remains a difficult issue due to the chaotic construction market and low penalties for breaking the law, officials said. The total of unpaid wages decreased by 16.7 percent compared with 2015, said Wang Cheng, head of labor security supervision at the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. Wage defaults have been a problem in China, especially before Spring Festival, which falls on Jan 28 this year. Migrant workers who fail to get their wages and can’t get back home for the most important festival in China often win widespread sympathy.
Source: South China Morning Post

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

China to sell new short-range missile to foreign countries

China plans to sell to foreign countries its new short-range air to surface missile which can be mounted on drones and is designed for anti-terrorism operations. The China Academy of Aerospace Aerodynamics, the country’s largest military drone exporter by number of products sold overseas, said it recently conducted live-fire tests on the AR-2 short-range air-to-surface missile in northwestern China. The AR-2 is seen as tough competition for US, French and Israeli missiles, state-run China Daily reported on February 3. With a weight of about 20 kilograms and a 5 kilograms warhead, an AR-2 has a maximum range of 8km and a top speed of 735km per hour. It is effective against personnel, armoured cars, houses or bunkers, its designers said.
Source: The Times of India

Pakistan PM hails friendship with China, CPEC

Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said that China and Pakistan are now bonded through ever strong friendship, according to a statement from the Chinese embassy in Islamabad on January 28. On behalf of the people and government of Pakistan, the prime minister expressed his good wishes for the people, leadership and the Chinese government on the advent of new Lunar year being celebrated in China. He also said that the bilateral partnership in the form of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor will prove to be a historical milestone in the Pak-China bilateral relations.
Source: Global Times

ECONOMY

Green bonds take root in China

Green bonds are starting to look like an increasingly attractive investment prospect in China as the estimated costs to clean up the environment and cut emissions mount, increasing the need for environmentally friendly financing plans. Liang Chao, a manager of the investment department of JC Bank, began to take an interest in green bonds in October. Like other commercial lenders, JC Bank, which is based in Shanxi, China’s largest coal-mining province, is considering using green bonds to help companies fund and develop sustainable projects that benefit the environment. In China, “green bonds” refer to debt instruments that allow investors to support environmentally friendly projects that save energy, reduce carbon emissions and cut pollution. Both companies and financial institutions can issue green bonds.
Source: Caixin

China’s manufacturing shows signs of stabilising economy

China’s manufacturing sector has expanded for the sixth month in a row, a sign the economy is stabilizing amid an uncertain global outlook. The country’s manufacturing purchasing managers’ index (PMI) came in at 51.3 in January, 0.1 lower than in December, according to data released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) February 1. A reading above 50 indicates expansion, while below 50 reflects contraction. NBS statistician Zhao Qinghe said the readings in January had remained at a high level since 2012, which pointed to steady expansion of the manufacturing sector. The sub-index for production was 53.1, 0.2 lower than in December, while the sub-index for new orders was down 0.4 to 52.8. Zhao attributed the deceleration of production and new orders to the Lunar New Year holiday, which reduces work days. China reported 6.7 percent GDP growth in 2016, lower than in recent years but within the government’s target range. Zhao noted that the sub-index for the high-tech manufacturing sector had increased by 1.9 to 55.7, remarkably higher than other sectors.