Showing posts with label Indian Foreign Policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Indian Foreign Policy. Show all posts

Thursday, 30 March 2017

Chinese regional hegemony is a bridge too far

Chinese Hegemony
The National Intelligence Council (NIC) of the United States released its Global Trends report last month. Titled Paradox of Progress, it warns its readers to buckle themselves for an increasingly turbulent future. Much of this turbulence, it argues, would emanate from a phenomenon the world has not seen in at least since the end of the Cold War: hegemonic struggles among major powers. The decline of American power, according to the NIC, is one of the main reasons for such grim prognostication. But so is the possibility of China replacing the US hegemony. In short, the report appears to confirm an already existing impression: that the global liberal order, largely a product of post-Second World War US power, may be short-lived. The most likely casualty of this power shift would be the US hegemony in the Indo-Pacific.
The decline of the US power is arguably manifesting itself in the current inward trend in US foreign policy. The US now intends to tamper down on its commitments to its allies in the Asia-Pacific and is actively encouraging them to bear most of the burden of their alliance commitments. Rather than an active balancer of Chinese power in the Indo-Pacific, the US appears to be moving to a posture of off-shore balancing. Neo-isolationist tendencies in American body politic may further entrench China’s hegemonic role in the region, analysts fear.
Despite a grim perception of a decline in the US power in Asia and China’s rise, it is not readily evident that the regional order in the Indo-Pacific will witness a Chinese hegemony. To achieve regional hegemony, three conditions are necessary. First, a regional hegemon has to effectively control not only the continental sphere of influence but also the maritime domain. Second, regional hegemony requires all possible rivals to be neutralised. Lastly, hegemony must exude a benign character since the difference between hegemony and raw power is one of legitimacy. China falls short in all these categories.
China by its nature has always been a continental power. It is hemmed in by land frontiers from three directions. Some of these are disputed, for example the India-China border. In Central Asia, its intentions to expand its sphere of influence contests with those of Russia. Even when China has pacified most of its territorial disputes, the contestations on the continental front are still active. Moreover, China’s growing dominance in the continental sphere notwithstanding, its maritime frontiers remain far from stable. . China’s maritime presence is restricted by geography itself. Its access to the Pacific Ocean is blocked by a ring of hostile Island Chains. The presence of states such as Taiwan, Philippines, and Japan are natural obstacles to China’s maritime influence. Its access to the Indian Ocean is similarly imperilled by the tyranny of geography especially its Malacca dilemma. However, the real problem for China is the presence of the US Navy and its unparalleled control over Asia-Pacific’s maritime domain. China’s sea denial capabilities in the form of a substantive submarine fleet and anti-access missiles are largely defensive systems which add little to its ability to project power. As David Shambaugh argues, “Chinese military forces still possess no conventional global power-projection capabilities.”  Projection of power demands sea control capabilities: a large fleet of aircraft carriers. With its first aircraft carrier still under development, that is a prospect which will require substantial effort and time. It will also lead to employment of asymmetric warfare against its own sea control assets, as is currently the Chinese strategy towards the US Navy. And even when US may decide to gradually move out of the Indo-Pacific, a remote possibility indeed, China will have to contend other equally capable navies especially with Japan in East Asia and India in the Indian Ocean. China’s prospects of dominating the Asia-Pacific’s maritime domain are therefore bleak. And if the history of great power rivalries has anything to offer for contemporary analysis, no continental power can be a regional hegemon without establishing an absolute control over the maritime domain. That Beijing realises its maritime vulnerability is evident in China’s frantic attempts to get access to the Indian Ocean through land corridors and naval bases, success of which many argue is doomed to failure.
Second, continental powers generate much more friction than maritime powers do. As Edward Luttwak explains in the Logic of Strategy, the rise of Chinese power will automatically generate countervailing balances. Unlike maritime powers which tend to control the oceans and have limited capacity to pursue territorial aggression, continental powers are perceived to be more hostile due to their capability to pursue territorial harm. Balances of power are more frequently achieved against continental powers as against maritime powers. The case of Germany in both First and Second World War is a case in point. But so was the case of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. China’s maritime disputes with most of its neighbours add to this explosive mix. When seen holistically, China’s rise in the region has led to an increase in balancing activity by other states in the region whether big or small. From India to Japan and Vietnam, the region is witnessing a rise in both internal balancing (increasing military expenditures) but also external balancing. The latter is particularly relevant in the strategic interactions between India, Japan, Australia, Singapore, Vietnam and the US. In the Indo-Pacific, China is increasingly been seen as a hostile power, one that might also remain “lonely”.
If China cannot possibly overcome its continental character to transform into a dominant maritime power and its rise would continue to generate more friction with other states, it’s most difficult internal challenge would be to provide a veneer of legitimacy to its growing power. The US hegemony led to the creation of a liberal global order which benefited most states to some extent. The rise of China in the last quarter of a century could not have been possible without the US-led liberal order. Even if the US hegemony was contested in certain quarters, it was also widely accepted because the US could externalise the benefits of its hegemony to other stakeholders, be it through commerce, institutions, rules and norms. China’s message of harmonious development and peaceful rise was a similar attempt to make its rise more acceptable to the broader Indo-Pacific. But China’s behaviour in recent years has, rather than creating additional legitimacy for itself, made other states more anxious. China’s insulated domestic politics is one reason for this anxiety. Unlike democratic powers, lack of transparency in China’s internal politics creates uncertainty about its intentions. This is most obvious in the debate over China’s military spending. China’s one-party rule does not allow any kind of external influence on its domestic policy. It has been suggested by some that the US hegemony was benign particularly because its domestic politics was always influenced by interest-groups representing many ethnicities and nationalities. In China, such external influences are not possible. Finally, if China was to be the regional growth-engine, recent trends suggest that China may not be able to externalise even the economic benefits in the region. The process of de-globalisation will force China to adopt similar neo-mercantilist economic policies. It has already started transforming its export-oriented economy into one which is sustained by internal consumption. For many of Asia’s smaller economies, penetrating Chinese markets therefore would be an increasingly burdensome exercise.
Notwithstanding NIC’s emphasis on the emerging disorder in the region and beyond, Chinese hegemony in the Indo-Pacific appears to be some way off. One may not dispute the decline in American power and more so its willingness to engage in the region, but to suggest that China will automatically replace United States as the regional hegemon is far-fetched. The current strategic flux surely does make the region and the globe more chaotic but it also offers opportunities to other rising powers like India. For one, it provides India greater strategic space which if used judiciously may help in extracting concessions from the Chinese. If history is any guide to Chinese behaviour, the alignment of international politics has always been a major determinant of Chinese behaviour vis-a-vis New Delhi. For example, after the Sino-Soviet clashes of March 1969, India and China began their first dialogue after the 1962 war. By using China’s sensitivity over its perceived vulnerability in a hegemonic contest with the US, India may profit from this strategic flux. It will also allow her to increase its position in the Indo-Pacific’s new regional order and to create substantive partnerships with countries like Japan and South Korea which New Delhi needs for its own economic development. Finally, any rising power like India needs regional followers. As China’s power increases and perceptions of American decline get further entrenched in the region, India’s efforts to mediate and stand for a liberal regional order may increase its influence especially with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. Increasing uncertainty, as the NIC report suggests, brings disorder but such situations also raise the value of key swing states like India. For rising powers, some disorder is also a virtue.

South China Sea | Vol. VI, Issue 3

THE ISSUE: China announces observation platforms in the South China Sea

 Adding to the already existing number of constructions, Beijing announced that it is in the process of building an underwater observation platform in the South China Sea. The platform will serve as an observation station for studying underwater conditions in real time and will be built with the help of Tongji University and the Institute of Acoustics. The announcement came in late February and close on the heels of another declaration that the country plans to develop floating nuclear power plants in the South China Sea. The purpose of the plants will be to supply electricity to islands in the region, especially to the offshore projects being established by China and to benefit oil and gas exploration.
The China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) has informed that the country plans to develop 20 such nuclear plants, which are expected to begin operations around 2019, to boost both power and water supplies. The platforms are also expected to facilitate power supply in times of emergency and natural disasters. China started building its first floating nuclear power reactor in November last year. The underwater observation platform, which will be the first of its kind, will explore undersea physical, chemical, and geological dynamics along with being directed at other purposes. It is not very clear what these other purposes might be.
Constructions being built by China on the islands and reefs that dot the South China Sea have the subject of deliberations over the last few years. They have drawn attention primarily for three reasons. First, these constructions which include artificial islands and air strips besides the platforms announced in February are located in maritime territory that is disputed with competing sovereignty claims made by China and littoral countries like Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia among others. Second, the nature and objective of the constructions is of concern among countries in the Asia-Pacific region which many suspecting that military and naval utilization by China cannot be ruled out.  The third reason is the pace at which China seems to be developing the constructions. While the reefs, atolls and waters of the South China Sea have been disputed for years, it is only recently that Beijing has begun to ‘reclaim’ the physical space of the region.
China is increasingly and intensely feeling the pressures of rising energy needs along with what gradually appears to be a slowing economic growth. The developments being pursued by China in its immediate maritime space can be understood as the country’s response to the need for meeting its energy demands and also giving a fillip to the economy. What is interesting for observers and disconcerting for those concerned is the ambit that China regards as its sovereign space. Having refused to acknowledge the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in July last year, Beijing’s insistence and interpretation of what constitutes as its sovereign territory and its denial of international law and dispute resolution measures have contributed to both ambiguity and apprehension regarding the objectives behind its actions in the South China Sea.

MEDIA WATCH

China to build first underwater platform in South China Sea

China will build its first long-term underwater observation platform in resource-rich South China Sea, where it has territorial disputes with many south-east Asian countries including Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. The platform aims to observe underwater conditions in real time. “Construction work on the long-term observation platform covering key areas in the South China and East China seas will be done with the help of Shanghai’s Tongji University and the Institute of Acoustics,” Wang Pinxian, an academic at the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) said.

Indonesia to raise prospect of joint patrols with Australia in South China Sea

Indonesia President Joko Widodo will discuss the prospect of joint patrols with Australia in the South China Sea when he meets his counterpart Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull at the weekend. Widodo said he would like to see joint patrols with Australia, but only if did not further inflame tensions with China. Indonesia has traditionally taken a neutral position on the South China Sea, acting as a buffer between China and fellow members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that have the most at stake, the Philippines and Vietnam.
Source: (Reuters)

China urges US to contribute to peace in South China Sea

China said on Tuesday that it hoped the United States would do what is good to the peace and stability in the South China Sea as a U.S. aircraft carrier strike group began patrolling the region. “China always respects the freedom of navigation and overflight of all countries in the South China Sea in accordance with international law, but we oppose those who threaten and harm the sovereignty and security of coastal countries under the pretext of freedom of navigation and overflight,” said Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang at the daily press briefing.
Source: (Xinhua)

ASEAN ministers call for continuous South China Sea dialogue

Foreign ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) noted the importance of sustaining the momentum of dialogue in easing the tensions in the disputed South China Sea, the Philippines’ top diplomat said on Tuesday. Foreign Affairs Secretary Perfecto Yasay Jr. said that a number of his counterparts expressed concern over the possible militarization of some areas in the region during the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat in Boracay. The foreign ministers affirmed the importance of pursuing peaceful resolution of disputes without resorting to use of force and in accordance with the international law including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Source: (Philstar)

China wraps up exercise with three warships in South China Sea

Three Chinese warships on Friday wrapped up a week of scheduled training exercises in the South China Sea, shortly after China’s sole aircraft carrier tested its weapons in the disputed region. The flotilla of warships, including a destroyer that can launch guided missiles, had been conducting drills since Friday last week and were now sailing to the eastern India Ocean and the Western Pacific. The training included sudden attack drills and had been carried out successfully in poor sea conditions.
Source:(Economic Times)

Japan to speed up frigate build to reinforce East China Sea

Japan plans to accelerate a warship building program to make two frigates a year to patrol the fringes of the East China Sea, where it disputes island ownership with China, three people with knowledge of the plan said. Japan previously was building one 5,000-ton class destroyer a year, but will now make two 3,000-ton class ships a year, beginning from the April 2018 fiscal year, the people said, declining to be identified as they are not authorized to talk to the media. It aims to produce a fleet of eight of the new class of smaller, cheaper vessels, which may also have mine-sweeping and anti-submarine capability.
Source: (Reuters)

China plans to build floating nuclear plants in South China Sea

China has said it will develop floating nuclear power plants on a priority basis in the South China Sea as it seeks to beef up electricity supply to the islands in the disputed maritime region. China will prioritise the development of a floating nuclear power platform in the coming five years, in an effort to provide stable power to offshore projects and promote ocean gas exploitation. The development of the facility is a crucial part of the country’s five-year economic development plan, running through 2020.

Trump’s Taiwan rethink and India

Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s phone call to President-Elect Donald Trump last week triggered uproar in foreign policy circles of China, US & beyond
Taiwan’s first woman President, Tsai Ing-wen’s phone call to US President-Elect Donald Trump last week has triggered a huge uproar in the foreign policy circles of China, United States and beyond. Although Tsai has described the congratulatory call as a mere international etiquette, there’s much more to it than meets the eye.
The 10 minute telephonic conversation has raised eyebrows of foreign policy analysts due to a number of reasons. To begin with, Mr. Trump has annulled the 40 year old diplomatic protocol, and has become the first US President since 1979 to speak with the president of Republic of China (ROC).  The year 1979 was significant as it marked US’ recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the only legitimate government of China.
Second, the issue of cross-strait relations has three dimensions to it. While the US has expressed its official commitment to the ‘One China’ policy, PRC considers Taiwan as a renegade province, President Tsai refuses to recognise the concept of ‘One China’. Last week, while affirming this unprecedented phone call from Tsai, President Trump took to twitter and referred to her as the ‘President of Taiwan’. The usage of the term Taiwan instead of Republic of China, denotes that the incumbent US administration would prefer to view Taiwan as a separate entity and push for the country’s national sovereignty.
Third, regardless of whether the phone call was premeditated or not, this incident will undoubtedly leave a Chinese inkling on Trump’s strategic intentions. To add to it, President Trump’s recent interview to Fox News Sunday, where he has questioned the privileged position offered to the PRC by Washington’s adherence to the ‘One China’ policy and slammed China for issues such as currency devaluation, PRC’s stance in the South China Sea and towards North Korea could further flare up Sino-US tensions over Taiwan.
Fourth, the recent incident is a clear hint at the hardline strategy that will be adopted by the Trump administration towards China. Although the US officially appreciates China’s ‘peaceful rise’, fresh strains in the relationship caused by maritime disputes, cyber espionage and institutions established by the PRC that challenge the Western module of economic governance, have repeatedly brought these dominant powers against each other.  Considering the conservative orientation of Trump and his Republican followers, it is inferable that the new administration would not be as accommodative of China as the liberal democrats were under the Obama administration.  This was fairly evident during Trump’s election campaign when he accused China of being the “the single greatest currency manipulator that’s ever been on this planet”.
President Tsai, on her part, had orchestrated the phone call to Donald Trump to bring Taiwan back on the table.  In July 2016, Taiwan had ‘mistakenly’ launched a supersonic anti-ship missile towards China.  Such sequence of events clearly demonstrates that ROC under Tsai Ing-wen is taking a tough stance in dealing with cross-strait relations. Trump too, is playing the Taiwan card to send a strong signal to the Chinese leadership.
It is interesting to note that this evolving strategic synergy between the US and Taiwan have definite implications for India. Both India and the US are committed to the ‘One China’ policy and China is a common traditional security threat to all the three powers. Since the 1960s, the ‘China factor’ has loomed large in India’s foreign policy owing to an unsettled border, Beijing’s endorsement of Pakistan on issues relating to terrorism and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), China’s move to block India’s bid to secure membership in the NSG, China’s rising footprint in the Indian Ocean Region, and (most importantly) Beijing’s escalating military ties with the nations of South Asia. However, Trump’s unpredictable stance of engaging with Taiwan over a telephonic conversation has laid the roadmap for India to undertake a hardline strategy towards China, with the US support.

China Weekly Report | Vol. VII Issue 5

POLITICS & SOCIETY

China invites journalists to cover political meetings

Invitations have been sent out to journalists from China and abroad to cover two major Chinese political meetings next month.  The fifth annual session of the 12th National People’s Congress (NPC), the country’s top legislature, will open on March 5 in Beijing.  The fifth session of the 12th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the top political advisory body, will open on March 3. A media center for the two meetings will be open from Feb 27, the general offices of the NPC Standing Committee and the CPPCC National Committee announced. Chinese and foreign journalists should submit applications for passes to the media center, while foreign reporters temporarily in China for the “two sessions” should apply to Chinese embassies or visa organizations authorized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Reporters from Hong Kong and Macao should apply at the central government’s liaison offices in the two special administrative regions. Reporters from Taiwan should apply to the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office.
Source: China Daily

Government helps 3.7m workers get unpaid wages

The government helped more than 3.7 million migrant workers get their unpaid wages totaling more than 35 billion yuan ($5.1 billion) last year. However, the long-standing problem of migrant workers failing to get paid remains a difficult issue due to the chaotic construction market and low penalties for breaking the law, officials said. The total of unpaid wages decreased by 16.7 percent compared with 2015, said Wang Cheng, head of labor security supervision at the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. Wage defaults have been a problem in China, especially before Spring Festival, which falls on Jan 28 this year. Migrant workers who fail to get their wages and can’t get back home for the most important festival in China often win widespread sympathy.
Source: South China Morning Post

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

China to sell new short-range missile to foreign countries

China plans to sell to foreign countries its new short-range air to surface missile which can be mounted on drones and is designed for anti-terrorism operations. The China Academy of Aerospace Aerodynamics, the country’s largest military drone exporter by number of products sold overseas, said it recently conducted live-fire tests on the AR-2 short-range air-to-surface missile in northwestern China. The AR-2 is seen as tough competition for US, French and Israeli missiles, state-run China Daily reported on February 3. With a weight of about 20 kilograms and a 5 kilograms warhead, an AR-2 has a maximum range of 8km and a top speed of 735km per hour. It is effective against personnel, armoured cars, houses or bunkers, its designers said.
Source: The Times of India

Pakistan PM hails friendship with China, CPEC

Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said that China and Pakistan are now bonded through ever strong friendship, according to a statement from the Chinese embassy in Islamabad on January 28. On behalf of the people and government of Pakistan, the prime minister expressed his good wishes for the people, leadership and the Chinese government on the advent of new Lunar year being celebrated in China. He also said that the bilateral partnership in the form of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor will prove to be a historical milestone in the Pak-China bilateral relations.
Source: Global Times

ECONOMY

Green bonds take root in China

Green bonds are starting to look like an increasingly attractive investment prospect in China as the estimated costs to clean up the environment and cut emissions mount, increasing the need for environmentally friendly financing plans. Liang Chao, a manager of the investment department of JC Bank, began to take an interest in green bonds in October. Like other commercial lenders, JC Bank, which is based in Shanxi, China’s largest coal-mining province, is considering using green bonds to help companies fund and develop sustainable projects that benefit the environment. In China, “green bonds” refer to debt instruments that allow investors to support environmentally friendly projects that save energy, reduce carbon emissions and cut pollution. Both companies and financial institutions can issue green bonds.
Source: Caixin

China’s manufacturing shows signs of stabilising economy

China’s manufacturing sector has expanded for the sixth month in a row, a sign the economy is stabilizing amid an uncertain global outlook. The country’s manufacturing purchasing managers’ index (PMI) came in at 51.3 in January, 0.1 lower than in December, according to data released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) February 1. A reading above 50 indicates expansion, while below 50 reflects contraction. NBS statistician Zhao Qinghe said the readings in January had remained at a high level since 2012, which pointed to steady expansion of the manufacturing sector. The sub-index for production was 53.1, 0.2 lower than in December, while the sub-index for new orders was down 0.4 to 52.8. Zhao attributed the deceleration of production and new orders to the Lunar New Year holiday, which reduces work days. China reported 6.7 percent GDP growth in 2016, lower than in recent years but within the government’s target range. Zhao noted that the sub-index for the high-tech manufacturing sector had increased by 1.9 to 55.7, remarkably higher than other sectors.

China treads its way to global governance

China treads its way to global governance

Great Wall of China
As China assumes the presidency of BRICS in 2017, the question of Chinese vision of global governance has once again come to the forefront. With the global order undergoing a transformation, China has increasingly enthralled itself in promoting a refurbished global order defined by multipolarity. Essentially, China’s fascination with setting the terms of global governance stems from the country’s political and economic rise and the notion that for long the West has disdained Beijing from the stewardship of global governance norms.
For long, China has selectively used a two-pronged approach of promoting the idea of its peaceful rise alongside its assertiveness through warnings such as “no countries should expect us [China] to swallow the bitter fruit that undermines our sovereignty, security and development interests.” It is within this dynamic of threat, apprehension and suspicion about the evolving Chinese position in international politics that the country has staged itself as an integral part of chief international and regional bodies. In this context Beijing advocates that the country follows international rules, but these rules were formulated about half a century ago with little participation of China and that global governance norms must be modified with changing times. Therefore global governance reforms are of critical importance for the stability of the world order.
Interestingly, China’s vision of global governance dates back to the ancient idea of the tributary system. The tributary system was an asymmetrical and hierarchical order, according to which the Chinese recognized China as the Central Kingdom, located at the center of the universe. The Chinese emperor was identified as the Son of Heaven, who held the Mandate of Heaven and was consequently the legitimate ruler of “all-under-Heaven” (Tianxia).
At present, China seeks active participation in the issue of global governance for a number of reasons, namely reinstatement of its past glory, advancement of the country’s international status, promotion of its soft power diplomacy, reformation of international institutions so that they would in part reflect Chinese interests and preferences and most importantly ensure China more decision-making power in various international institutions and organizations.
To shore up its stature in international politics and consequently its stake in global governance, the Chinese leadership recognizes the importance of the accomplishment of its two “centenary goals” proposed by 18th CPC National Congress (2012), of establishing a prosperous society by 2021 and a modern socialist country by 2049. Thus, it is on the foundation of national rejuvenation that the country seeks to construct its image of a prevailing power in world politics. Consequently, to create an external environment conducive to the country’s ascendance, Chinese President Xi Jinping has emphasized the strategy of neighborhood diplomacy and a new type of major power relationship (xinxing daguo guanxi). China has not only strengthened its bilateral strategic partnerships with countries across the globe but also voiced its opinion on global governance reforms at various multilateral platforms such as BRICS, United Nations (UN), G20, Bretton Woods bodies and the like.
Essentially, the reforms that China insists upon refer to the restructuring of international institutions such as the Bretton Woods bodies (including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In its bid to bring about such reforms, of late China has embarked upon its own process of global institution building. A case in point is the institution of a Silk Road Fund, which seeks to enhance connectivity and trade within the framework of the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road and the Silk Road Economic Belt initiative; the BRICS-led New Development Bank; and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
This commentary originally appeared in Forbes.

The Suu Kyi factor in China’s Myanmar policy

As Myanmar's general elections draws nearer and at a time when China's relations with Myanmar's military-backed government comes under increasing strains in recent months, Beijing seems to be stepping up its multiple-engagement strategy with key political actors to prepare itself for any eventuality post-elections.
As Myanmar’s general elections, slated to be held later this year, draws nearer and at a time when China’s relations with Myanmar’s military-backed government under President Thein Sein comes under increasing strains in recent months, Beijing seems to be stepping up its multiple-engagement strategy with Myanmar’s key political actors to prepare itself for any eventuality post-elections.
Leading a delegation of her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), Myanmar’s opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi is on a five-day visit to China this week at the invitation of China Community Party (CCP). Questions on why the sudden visit or why now and what is the significance of the visit are being raised both inside and outside the country.
Suu Kyi’s visit comes at a time when relationship between the two countries is at its lowest ebb in recent years. Since Myanmar initiated democratic reforms in 2011, Beijing’s influence in Myanmar has been fading in the wake of Naypyitaw’s growing engagement with the West, particularly, the US.
Though China remains the largest trading partner of Myanmar, Beijing has been unhappy with President Thein Sein for the suspension of two major Chinese-backed projects – a cooper mine and a hydro project in northern Myanmar.
Tensions in China-Myanmar ties escalated in the recent months over Myanmar’s army offensives against ethnic rebels along the border involving an ethnic Han Chinese called Kokangs that has resulted in influx of refugees into China’s Yunnan Province and killing of four Chinese citizens in a bombing by Myanmar armed forces that strayed into the Chinese side.
China’s “multi-faceted diplomacy”
Over the past few years since Myanmar’s initiated democratic reforms in 2011, the CCP has been engaging different political parties of Myanmar under its party-to-party exchange with the aim to strengthen ties with key political stakeholders in Myanmar.
During Myanmar’s military-rule, China had to deal with only one political player – the junta. After reforms, Beijing adopted a new strategy to engage all the political actors of Myanmar since in the changed political environment the country has been driven by diverse political forces.
This is Suu Kyi’s first visit to China, but not for her party. In fact, a 12 member delegation that included NLD Central Executive Committee members, NLD member of parliaments and provincial NLD representatives had visited China in May 2013.
In April this year, speaker of Myanmar’s parliament and chairman of the ruling party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), Thura U Shwe Mann visited China and met senior leaders of the Chinese leadership including President Xi Jinping.
According to Xinhua news agency, President Xi called for high-level contacts and personnel exchanges between the CCP and the USDP and discussed Chinese “One Belt, One Road” initiative and the need to maintain border peace during his meeting with Shwe Mann. A proposal for a railway line connecting the Bay of Bengal with China’s Yunnan province has been stalled and Beijing has been pushing for Myanmar government’s approval.
President Xi may have discussed similar issues and called for better party-to-party ties with Suu Kyi during their meeting yesterday. Although there has been no detail about the agenda of the visit, the Chinese leadership might have expressed its desire to see the revival of the suspended projects.
Earlier in April 2013, China hosted a delegation led by Myanmar’s ruling party, which included five other political parties. Interestingly, NLD was not included in that delegation. In the same month, the CCP also invited Rakhine Nationalities Development Party. This is an indication that China is not only cultivating the bigger players but also smaller ethnic political parties.
Another Myanmar political parties’ delegation travelled to Kunming, Yunnan Province in June 2014 at the invitation of the CCP that included leaders from the Arakan National Party (ANP) and the National Democratic Force (NDF).
A common factor in most of these party visits is a stop at Kunming, Yunnan province, where Suu Kyi’s delegation is also expected to visit. For China, Yunnan province is at the heart of its Myanmar strategy. Yunnan province borders northern Myanmar and has huge stake in the overall China-Myanmar ties as it positions itself as the gateway to Myanmar.
Of late, developments along the border have emerged as a source of tension between the two countries due to the conflicts involving Myanmar army and ethnic rebels. From the Chinese perspective, deepening ties between Myanmar’s leaders and the provincial leaders are vital for the two countries and such visits are used to forge better ties and understanding between them.
Suu Kyi and the West
Since Suu Kyi joined politics in the late 1980s. China’s relations with Suu Kyi and her party the NLD has been negligible, particularly owing to the fact that Beijing had engaged the military-government in Myanmar that had imprisoned Suu Kyi for more than a decade.
As China’s ties with Myanmar peaks with the military government, the Western countries imposed sanctions on Myanmar and supported Suu Kyi’s struggle for democracy and human rights and made her a democracy icon.
After her release from house arrest and re-entry in politics, Suu Kyi has visited several capitals in the West, including the US and UK. China has seen these developments with some wariness, particularly because of Suu Kyi’s political stand and her international image which is seen as West-oriented.
Even as Suu Kyi has said on several occasions that China is an important neighbour and that Myanmar needs to maintain good relations with its northern neighbour, Beijing has remained doubtful.
From the Chinese perspective, the current visit of Suu Kyi is a big diplomatic success. Suu Kyi may also consider her visit as a demonstration to the Chinese that she would be willing to work with the Chinese in the future.
The Americans will be closely watching the developments as it would see this as Chinese ability to win over a political player who they expect could push their interests further in the Southeast Asian nation, as its strategic competition with China intensifies.
By inviting Suu Kyi to China, Beijing may also be sending a signal to the military-backed USDP that it is not the only player China has to depend upon, but if it wants it can make new friends in Myanmar.
Suu Kyi might have also seen the visit as a window of opportunity for her to build ties with the leadership of a powerful neighbour before her party faces the elections this year. If the NLD were to be elected to power, she recognises the significance of China in Myanmar’s foreign policy.
(The writer is a Research Fellow, Observer Research Foundation)