This paper looks at the recent Chinese infrastructural developments along the Sino-Indian border, including building of highways, road links and oil pipelines that have improved the country's force deployment and sustenance capabilities. The paper also assesses India?s infrastructure initiatives on the border front and argues that they are inadequate, especially in light of the Chinese developments.
Asia has been at the centre of emerging global politics, for a variety of reasons. Some of the world’s major military powers—India, China, Russia and the US—are in Asia; six of the nine nuclear powers are in Asia; some of the fastest growing economies are in Asia. Among these, China is an important country whose rise is inevitable but there is a need to recognize that the rise of any one power does not lead to a period of more insecurities and instability in the region. Since India, China and Japan are the rising powers in Asia they have to find ways of working with each other and not against each other. Each of the countries has a role in fostering an environment of cooperation in the Asian context.
As neighbours, there is a clear need for both India and China to engage in a manner that would contribute to peace and stability in the region and beyond. India-China relations have gone from one end of the spectrum to the other–“hindi-chini bhai bhai” to the 1962 border war to strenuous relations after India’s Pokhran tests. In fact, the relations are at their best today—the economic content of the relationship has improved tremendously, with trade touching $50 billion. However, there is a lot that needs to be done in the politico-strategic arena, as tension and suspicion continue to strain bilateral relations. These tensions do manifest themselves, from time to time, on the border and at various diplomatic fora. India’s border tension with China is only a symptom of the larger problem in the India-China equation. This is likely to continue until there is clarity on the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Despite the talks since 1981, the big push by successive Prime Ministers (Rajiv Gandhi during his visit in 1988, Atal Bihari Vajpayee during his visit in 2003, Manmohan Singh in his talks with Premier Wen Jiabao in 2005 and President Hu Jintao in 2006, Manmohan Singh’s visit in January 2008) and various other channels like the Special Representatives talks, there has hardly been any progress on demarcation or delineation of the LAC on the ground or on military maps. LAC has become a matter of perception; the Indian side has a perception of where the Line of Actual Control runs and Indian military patrols/border police patrols patrol up to that perceived LAC whereas the Chinese have a different perception of where the LAC is and they patrol up to their perceived LAC. In between, there is a red zone which overlaps and this is where the patrol face-offs take place. Despite the ambiguities, there has been no incident of firing since the last major incident at Nathu La in 1967; however, there was a serious standoff at Sumdorong Chu valley in 1987.
On the Indian side, there are multiple authorities managing the border, including the Army, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), the Border Security Force and the Assam Rifles. On the Chinese side, there is a single unified commander who is in charge of the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) forces. Thus, there is cohesiveness in China’s management of its perceived LAC. On the Indian side, management becomes slightly inefficient because in some places the Ministry of Home Affairs is responsible through the ITBP and in other places the Ministry of Defence is responsible through the Indian Army. Hence, the need for unity of command on the Indian side is of utmost importance.
With the above background, this paper attempts to deal with the infrastructure on the Sino-Indian border. While border management and force structure along the border are important issues, they do not necessarily fall within the purview of this paper. The paper is broadly structured into three sections: The first section gives details of China’s recent infrastructural developments along the Sino-Indian border. The focus is on the highways, road links and oil pipelines that improve its force deployment and sustenance capabilities. The second section looks at India’s initiatives on the border front. The last section provides details of the Indian approach to infrastructure building, arguing that it is inadequate especially in light of the Chinese developments.
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