Showing posts with label BRICS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label BRICS. Show all posts

Thursday, 30 March 2017

China’s domestic problems need not make us too happy, cautions Shourie

Mr. Arun Shourie, former Union minister and author, thinks that it was time for the India to develop and project itself in consonance with how it wants to be perceived by the world. He said this while delivering lecture on 'Sino-India Relations: The Changing Landscape' at ORF Kolkata.
2015
Sep
23
Arun Shourie, former Union minister and author, delivered a lecture on ‘Sino-Indian Relations: The Changing Landscape’ at ORF Kolkata on 19 September, organised as part of the Distinguished Lecture Series. He stated that it was time for the India to develop and project itself in consonance with how it wants to be perceived by the world.
He pointed out that a constant criticism that India has had to face over many years is that it fails to live up to the commitments made on paper. Because of this, the country loses vital opportunities for building and sustaining constructive relations with other countries, especially with neighbouring ones.
Shourie’s lecture factored in the problems that characterise Sino-Indian relations and the possible ways in which India might address them. He remarked that India should focus within and find ways of strengthening itself, instead of devoting too much attention and time to what is wrong in other countries.
On China, he remarked that the country was going through a great re-adjustment, if not a problem, while transforming itself from an investment-led economy to a consumption-led economy. He cautioned that China’s domestic problem need not make us too happy, for there could be reason for apprehension as well. Faced with an intractable domestic problem, China may well try to redirect popular attention toward a conjured up threat from a neighbour.
Shourie, a reputed newspaper editor, also felt that depending too much on the media for an understanding of what goes on between India and China could be self-defeating, because the media often sensationalises events that require careful consideration and patient handling. He was not willing to accept resolution of problems through agreements, as he believes that bilateral and multilateral agreements are of no use unless the other party knows that violations will have considerable cost.
Shourie argued that for any country, foreign policy is a long drawn out process in which a country gradually and silently creates a strong foundation for claiming authority in the global arena. That is exactly what China has done. From 2008 onwards, China has started to make its weight felt around the region through assertive, even sometimes aggressive, stances. Other countries can learn a lot from the process of China’s rise.
The lecture was followed by observations and comments by discussants.
Gen. Shankar Roychowdhury, former Army chief, highlighted that Zhou En-lai had offered a golden opportunity of dialogue to the-then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, which ultimately did not work out. But he insisted that there is still time to come to a mutual understanding with regard to land borders shared by the two countries and also with regard to maritime issues. He believes that economically, China is a much stronger country. India should boost its own economy and one way of achieving this would be through creating access for Indian manufactured goods in Chinese markets. The speaker felt that it was in the realm of cultural and people-to-people contacts that the two countries were making more progress. The areas in which India and China are in direct competition include Afghanistan and Nepal, where both countries are looking to increase their strategic influence. Tibet and Arunachal Pradesh are also issues that need consideration and resolution. He said India must learn to compete on an equal footing with China.
Manoj Joshi, Distinguished Fellow, ORF, began by remarking that he views Sino-India relations in terms of four C’s – conflict, cooperation, competition and containment. Talking about the first C, conflict, he underscored the presence of Chinese naval vessels in the Indian Ocean on the pretext of countering Somali piracy, which has been non-existent since 2012. This indicates that such presence is aimed at conducting training exercises. He related this maritime concern with China’s interest in the Indian Ocean and its larger policy goals regarding the Maritime Silk Route. He argued that berthing of submarines is more about indicating the presence of that plan than about maintaining maritime stability. On the issue of cooperation, Joshi highlighted the interaction between the two countries in multilateral fora (the BRICS bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and India’s recent membership to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) and in holding joint military exercises. But he said that there remains room for increased cooperation and that China has to play a role in the economic transformation of South and Southeast Asian regions. He added that apart from Zhou En-lai’s offer for dialogue, a similar offer was also made by Deng Xiaoping. India, however, refused both and since 2008 China has maintained that the conditions for those offers no longer exist.
Joshi referred to several factors while talking about competition between India and China, observing that China is in many ways, ahead of India. He drew attention to the recently held military parade commemorating China’s victory in WWII, which saw a massive display of weaponry. With regard to containment, he emphasised that though China claims India is part of US-led attempts to contain it, Chinese containment of India in South Asia via its activities in nations like Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Maldives has been a reality for years.
Responding to the lecture and the ensuing discussion, Ma Zhanwu, Consul General of the People’s Republic of China in Kolkata, said that Chinese foreign policy never aims at seeking hegemony, but takes care of its own territorial, sovereign and developmental interests. Elaborating this point, Ma said that the Chinese diplomats strictly adhere to the five principles of peaceful coexistence. China’s foreign policy goals are peace, development, cooperation and win-win strategy (added recently), he explained. He claimed that the islands in the South China Sea were part of Chinese territory, as has been the case for decades, according to Chinese history. He called for more people-to-people exchanges to strengthen relations between India and China. There are differences between them, but a positive approach would help overcome these differences.
Report prepared by Pratnashree Basu, Junior Fellow, ORF Kolkata.

South China Sea | Vol. VI, Issue 3

THE ISSUE: China announces observation platforms in the South China Sea

 Adding to the already existing number of constructions, Beijing announced that it is in the process of building an underwater observation platform in the South China Sea. The platform will serve as an observation station for studying underwater conditions in real time and will be built with the help of Tongji University and the Institute of Acoustics. The announcement came in late February and close on the heels of another declaration that the country plans to develop floating nuclear power plants in the South China Sea. The purpose of the plants will be to supply electricity to islands in the region, especially to the offshore projects being established by China and to benefit oil and gas exploration.
The China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) has informed that the country plans to develop 20 such nuclear plants, which are expected to begin operations around 2019, to boost both power and water supplies. The platforms are also expected to facilitate power supply in times of emergency and natural disasters. China started building its first floating nuclear power reactor in November last year. The underwater observation platform, which will be the first of its kind, will explore undersea physical, chemical, and geological dynamics along with being directed at other purposes. It is not very clear what these other purposes might be.
Constructions being built by China on the islands and reefs that dot the South China Sea have the subject of deliberations over the last few years. They have drawn attention primarily for three reasons. First, these constructions which include artificial islands and air strips besides the platforms announced in February are located in maritime territory that is disputed with competing sovereignty claims made by China and littoral countries like Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia among others. Second, the nature and objective of the constructions is of concern among countries in the Asia-Pacific region which many suspecting that military and naval utilization by China cannot be ruled out.  The third reason is the pace at which China seems to be developing the constructions. While the reefs, atolls and waters of the South China Sea have been disputed for years, it is only recently that Beijing has begun to ‘reclaim’ the physical space of the region.
China is increasingly and intensely feeling the pressures of rising energy needs along with what gradually appears to be a slowing economic growth. The developments being pursued by China in its immediate maritime space can be understood as the country’s response to the need for meeting its energy demands and also giving a fillip to the economy. What is interesting for observers and disconcerting for those concerned is the ambit that China regards as its sovereign space. Having refused to acknowledge the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in July last year, Beijing’s insistence and interpretation of what constitutes as its sovereign territory and its denial of international law and dispute resolution measures have contributed to both ambiguity and apprehension regarding the objectives behind its actions in the South China Sea.

MEDIA WATCH

China to build first underwater platform in South China Sea

China will build its first long-term underwater observation platform in resource-rich South China Sea, where it has territorial disputes with many south-east Asian countries including Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. The platform aims to observe underwater conditions in real time. “Construction work on the long-term observation platform covering key areas in the South China and East China seas will be done with the help of Shanghai’s Tongji University and the Institute of Acoustics,” Wang Pinxian, an academic at the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) said.

Indonesia to raise prospect of joint patrols with Australia in South China Sea

Indonesia President Joko Widodo will discuss the prospect of joint patrols with Australia in the South China Sea when he meets his counterpart Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull at the weekend. Widodo said he would like to see joint patrols with Australia, but only if did not further inflame tensions with China. Indonesia has traditionally taken a neutral position on the South China Sea, acting as a buffer between China and fellow members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that have the most at stake, the Philippines and Vietnam.
Source: (Reuters)

China urges US to contribute to peace in South China Sea

China said on Tuesday that it hoped the United States would do what is good to the peace and stability in the South China Sea as a U.S. aircraft carrier strike group began patrolling the region. “China always respects the freedom of navigation and overflight of all countries in the South China Sea in accordance with international law, but we oppose those who threaten and harm the sovereignty and security of coastal countries under the pretext of freedom of navigation and overflight,” said Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang at the daily press briefing.
Source: (Xinhua)

ASEAN ministers call for continuous South China Sea dialogue

Foreign ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) noted the importance of sustaining the momentum of dialogue in easing the tensions in the disputed South China Sea, the Philippines’ top diplomat said on Tuesday. Foreign Affairs Secretary Perfecto Yasay Jr. said that a number of his counterparts expressed concern over the possible militarization of some areas in the region during the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat in Boracay. The foreign ministers affirmed the importance of pursuing peaceful resolution of disputes without resorting to use of force and in accordance with the international law including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Source: (Philstar)

China wraps up exercise with three warships in South China Sea

Three Chinese warships on Friday wrapped up a week of scheduled training exercises in the South China Sea, shortly after China’s sole aircraft carrier tested its weapons in the disputed region. The flotilla of warships, including a destroyer that can launch guided missiles, had been conducting drills since Friday last week and were now sailing to the eastern India Ocean and the Western Pacific. The training included sudden attack drills and had been carried out successfully in poor sea conditions.
Source:(Economic Times)

Japan to speed up frigate build to reinforce East China Sea

Japan plans to accelerate a warship building program to make two frigates a year to patrol the fringes of the East China Sea, where it disputes island ownership with China, three people with knowledge of the plan said. Japan previously was building one 5,000-ton class destroyer a year, but will now make two 3,000-ton class ships a year, beginning from the April 2018 fiscal year, the people said, declining to be identified as they are not authorized to talk to the media. It aims to produce a fleet of eight of the new class of smaller, cheaper vessels, which may also have mine-sweeping and anti-submarine capability.
Source: (Reuters)

China plans to build floating nuclear plants in South China Sea

China has said it will develop floating nuclear power plants on a priority basis in the South China Sea as it seeks to beef up electricity supply to the islands in the disputed maritime region. China will prioritise the development of a floating nuclear power platform in the coming five years, in an effort to provide stable power to offshore projects and promote ocean gas exploitation. The development of the facility is a crucial part of the country’s five-year economic development plan, running through 2020.

Trump’s Taiwan rethink and India

Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s phone call to President-Elect Donald Trump last week triggered uproar in foreign policy circles of China, US & beyond
Taiwan’s first woman President, Tsai Ing-wen’s phone call to US President-Elect Donald Trump last week has triggered a huge uproar in the foreign policy circles of China, United States and beyond. Although Tsai has described the congratulatory call as a mere international etiquette, there’s much more to it than meets the eye.
The 10 minute telephonic conversation has raised eyebrows of foreign policy analysts due to a number of reasons. To begin with, Mr. Trump has annulled the 40 year old diplomatic protocol, and has become the first US President since 1979 to speak with the president of Republic of China (ROC).  The year 1979 was significant as it marked US’ recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the only legitimate government of China.
Second, the issue of cross-strait relations has three dimensions to it. While the US has expressed its official commitment to the ‘One China’ policy, PRC considers Taiwan as a renegade province, President Tsai refuses to recognise the concept of ‘One China’. Last week, while affirming this unprecedented phone call from Tsai, President Trump took to twitter and referred to her as the ‘President of Taiwan’. The usage of the term Taiwan instead of Republic of China, denotes that the incumbent US administration would prefer to view Taiwan as a separate entity and push for the country’s national sovereignty.
Third, regardless of whether the phone call was premeditated or not, this incident will undoubtedly leave a Chinese inkling on Trump’s strategic intentions. To add to it, President Trump’s recent interview to Fox News Sunday, where he has questioned the privileged position offered to the PRC by Washington’s adherence to the ‘One China’ policy and slammed China for issues such as currency devaluation, PRC’s stance in the South China Sea and towards North Korea could further flare up Sino-US tensions over Taiwan.
Fourth, the recent incident is a clear hint at the hardline strategy that will be adopted by the Trump administration towards China. Although the US officially appreciates China’s ‘peaceful rise’, fresh strains in the relationship caused by maritime disputes, cyber espionage and institutions established by the PRC that challenge the Western module of economic governance, have repeatedly brought these dominant powers against each other.  Considering the conservative orientation of Trump and his Republican followers, it is inferable that the new administration would not be as accommodative of China as the liberal democrats were under the Obama administration.  This was fairly evident during Trump’s election campaign when he accused China of being the “the single greatest currency manipulator that’s ever been on this planet”.
President Tsai, on her part, had orchestrated the phone call to Donald Trump to bring Taiwan back on the table.  In July 2016, Taiwan had ‘mistakenly’ launched a supersonic anti-ship missile towards China.  Such sequence of events clearly demonstrates that ROC under Tsai Ing-wen is taking a tough stance in dealing with cross-strait relations. Trump too, is playing the Taiwan card to send a strong signal to the Chinese leadership.
It is interesting to note that this evolving strategic synergy between the US and Taiwan have definite implications for India. Both India and the US are committed to the ‘One China’ policy and China is a common traditional security threat to all the three powers. Since the 1960s, the ‘China factor’ has loomed large in India’s foreign policy owing to an unsettled border, Beijing’s endorsement of Pakistan on issues relating to terrorism and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), China’s move to block India’s bid to secure membership in the NSG, China’s rising footprint in the Indian Ocean Region, and (most importantly) Beijing’s escalating military ties with the nations of South Asia. However, Trump’s unpredictable stance of engaging with Taiwan over a telephonic conversation has laid the roadmap for India to undertake a hardline strategy towards China, with the US support.

The SCO Bank should wake India up to the strategic consequences of Chinese capital

SCO Bank should be flagged as a competitor to India-led initiatives like BRICS Bank, which may undermine New Delhi’s role as an economic power in the region.
Beijing, November 2016: At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s (SCO) heads of government meet this week in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, China formally proposed the creation of an SCO Bank to promote development and “boost financial cooperation.” The proposal, accepted by the six member group, is significant for three reasons:
First, unlike other financing initiatives in the region where China is involved, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is a security oriented bloc. The Chinese proposal  is interesting because SCO countries are all founding members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as well, raising questions about the additional purpose that the SCO Bank presumably serves. It is unlikely the SCO Bank’s management or lending rates will be any different. But in comparison to the AIIB, Beijing would have considerable flexibility in determining what projects the SCO should fund, thanks to its dominance of the group. Through its proposed creation of the SCO Bank, China has sought to tie its underwriting of economic development in the Eurasian landmass with its strategic goals for the region. The SCO is not ASEAN, but the bloc shares a considerable degree of political and military consensus that would aid the SCO Bank’s decision making process.

Through its proposed creation of the SCO Bank, China has sought to tie its underwriting of economic development in the Eurasian landmass with its strategic goals for the region.

Second, the SCO Bank could quickly emerge as a competitor to the BRICS New Development Bank, given Russia’s immediate interests in its neighbourhood. Pakistan, absent from the BRICS grouping, may attempt to steer infrastructure development through the SCO, sensing an opportunity to participate in regional projects (say, through an extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor). India, along with Pakistan, will join the bloc formally in 2017 but New Delhi would at best be a junior partner in SCO projects, as opposed to the stature it enjoys in the BRICS grouping.
Third, Beijing has made it clear there is “synergy” between the Belt and Road project (OBOR) and the Eurasian Economic Union, and the SCO Bank may be a carrot for Central Asian states that have so far stayed away to sign up to OBOR. Moreover, Moscow had already agreed to formally link OBOR to the EEU. The prospect of the SCO Bank becoming a conduit for Russia-China efforts to jointly project economic power in the EEU will ring alarm bells in Western capitals.

What does it mean for India?

The SCO Bank is another reminder that New Delhi should be sensitive to the strategic consequences of Chinese capital investments in Asia. Political influence that accrues as a result of bilateral investment is only one such consequence. If anything, recent attempts by China to gain clout in Maldives, Sri Lanka and Nepal by investing in massive infrastructure projects have shown the limits of this approach. But, entities like the SCO Bank give Beijing room to link project financing with its Silk Route project, and determine the economic outlook of the region. This is perhaps of most concern to India, given that its service-oriented businesses are competitive at the higher end of the supply chain. Were projects like OBOR or the SCO Bank result in captive markets in Central and South East Asia for Beijing, it will be easy for Chinese companies to move up the supply chain once the base infrastructure has been put in place. At that stage, it may be difficult for Indian businesses to influence investment guidelines, industry norms or standards as they relate to the provision of services.

The Alibaba example

A good example is Alibaba, China’s top e-commerce company. Even as Huawei looks to be the dominant supplier of telecom and ICT infrastructure in the region, Alibaba will likely expand its footprint in Russia and Eurasia this decade. It is conceivable that Alipay, Alibaba’s payment portal, will be promoted as a fast and efficient way of transacting on the internet — after all, the logistics chain would have been set up by China, and most vendors will be comfortable with a Chinese payment gateway. Would Indian vendors, and innovators in financial technology be crowded out of the market as a result? Would China’s dominance of ‘fintech’ systems also allow it to mould encryption and data protection norms in the region? Will Indian services that rely on retail outsourcing find that some markets in Asia have been closed to them even before they enter it?
Alibaba, China, ecommerce, legitimacy, market return, reconcile, reality, trajectory, growth
Courtesy: Alibaba.com via Twitter
These dire outcomes need not come to pass, but Indian policy planners should be mindful of the potential impact of strategic Chinese investments. The SCO Bank should also be flagged as a competitor to India-led or involved initiatives like the BRICS Bank, which may undermine New Delhi’s role as a economic power in the region. This is not say India should stay away from the SCO Bank. Certain realities remain unchanged: China has plenty of money to pass around; Pakistan will attempt to court Beijing as a site for potential investment; and the Russia-China axis will grow stronger in the years to come. India gets little by staying out of the game. Beijing is certainly keen, both for the sake of legitimacy and for sound market returns, to invest in India. Whether those investments should be coupled with a China-India partnership on larger economic projects is for both capitals to decide. India may have to reconcile with the reality that it will not be an equal partner to Beijing in the design of certain infrastructure projects, but there is no alternative to engagement. By staying out of Chinese-led regional initiatives, India loses a crucial opportunity to secure the future of its own businesses and projects in Asia, and indeed, determine the trajectory of growth.
This is the final of the three part series on China’s foreign policy and what its evolution means for India.

The Suu Kyi factor in China’s Myanmar policy

As Myanmar's general elections draws nearer and at a time when China's relations with Myanmar's military-backed government comes under increasing strains in recent months, Beijing seems to be stepping up its multiple-engagement strategy with key political actors to prepare itself for any eventuality post-elections.
As Myanmar’s general elections, slated to be held later this year, draws nearer and at a time when China’s relations with Myanmar’s military-backed government under President Thein Sein comes under increasing strains in recent months, Beijing seems to be stepping up its multiple-engagement strategy with Myanmar’s key political actors to prepare itself for any eventuality post-elections.
Leading a delegation of her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), Myanmar’s opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi is on a five-day visit to China this week at the invitation of China Community Party (CCP). Questions on why the sudden visit or why now and what is the significance of the visit are being raised both inside and outside the country.
Suu Kyi’s visit comes at a time when relationship between the two countries is at its lowest ebb in recent years. Since Myanmar initiated democratic reforms in 2011, Beijing’s influence in Myanmar has been fading in the wake of Naypyitaw’s growing engagement with the West, particularly, the US.
Though China remains the largest trading partner of Myanmar, Beijing has been unhappy with President Thein Sein for the suspension of two major Chinese-backed projects – a cooper mine and a hydro project in northern Myanmar.
Tensions in China-Myanmar ties escalated in the recent months over Myanmar’s army offensives against ethnic rebels along the border involving an ethnic Han Chinese called Kokangs that has resulted in influx of refugees into China’s Yunnan Province and killing of four Chinese citizens in a bombing by Myanmar armed forces that strayed into the Chinese side.
China’s “multi-faceted diplomacy”
Over the past few years since Myanmar’s initiated democratic reforms in 2011, the CCP has been engaging different political parties of Myanmar under its party-to-party exchange with the aim to strengthen ties with key political stakeholders in Myanmar.
During Myanmar’s military-rule, China had to deal with only one political player – the junta. After reforms, Beijing adopted a new strategy to engage all the political actors of Myanmar since in the changed political environment the country has been driven by diverse political forces.
This is Suu Kyi’s first visit to China, but not for her party. In fact, a 12 member delegation that included NLD Central Executive Committee members, NLD member of parliaments and provincial NLD representatives had visited China in May 2013.
In April this year, speaker of Myanmar’s parliament and chairman of the ruling party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), Thura U Shwe Mann visited China and met senior leaders of the Chinese leadership including President Xi Jinping.
According to Xinhua news agency, President Xi called for high-level contacts and personnel exchanges between the CCP and the USDP and discussed Chinese “One Belt, One Road” initiative and the need to maintain border peace during his meeting with Shwe Mann. A proposal for a railway line connecting the Bay of Bengal with China’s Yunnan province has been stalled and Beijing has been pushing for Myanmar government’s approval.
President Xi may have discussed similar issues and called for better party-to-party ties with Suu Kyi during their meeting yesterday. Although there has been no detail about the agenda of the visit, the Chinese leadership might have expressed its desire to see the revival of the suspended projects.
Earlier in April 2013, China hosted a delegation led by Myanmar’s ruling party, which included five other political parties. Interestingly, NLD was not included in that delegation. In the same month, the CCP also invited Rakhine Nationalities Development Party. This is an indication that China is not only cultivating the bigger players but also smaller ethnic political parties.
Another Myanmar political parties’ delegation travelled to Kunming, Yunnan Province in June 2014 at the invitation of the CCP that included leaders from the Arakan National Party (ANP) and the National Democratic Force (NDF).
A common factor in most of these party visits is a stop at Kunming, Yunnan province, where Suu Kyi’s delegation is also expected to visit. For China, Yunnan province is at the heart of its Myanmar strategy. Yunnan province borders northern Myanmar and has huge stake in the overall China-Myanmar ties as it positions itself as the gateway to Myanmar.
Of late, developments along the border have emerged as a source of tension between the two countries due to the conflicts involving Myanmar army and ethnic rebels. From the Chinese perspective, deepening ties between Myanmar’s leaders and the provincial leaders are vital for the two countries and such visits are used to forge better ties and understanding between them.
Suu Kyi and the West
Since Suu Kyi joined politics in the late 1980s. China’s relations with Suu Kyi and her party the NLD has been negligible, particularly owing to the fact that Beijing had engaged the military-government in Myanmar that had imprisoned Suu Kyi for more than a decade.
As China’s ties with Myanmar peaks with the military government, the Western countries imposed sanctions on Myanmar and supported Suu Kyi’s struggle for democracy and human rights and made her a democracy icon.
After her release from house arrest and re-entry in politics, Suu Kyi has visited several capitals in the West, including the US and UK. China has seen these developments with some wariness, particularly because of Suu Kyi’s political stand and her international image which is seen as West-oriented.
Even as Suu Kyi has said on several occasions that China is an important neighbour and that Myanmar needs to maintain good relations with its northern neighbour, Beijing has remained doubtful.
From the Chinese perspective, the current visit of Suu Kyi is a big diplomatic success. Suu Kyi may also consider her visit as a demonstration to the Chinese that she would be willing to work with the Chinese in the future.
The Americans will be closely watching the developments as it would see this as Chinese ability to win over a political player who they expect could push their interests further in the Southeast Asian nation, as its strategic competition with China intensifies.
By inviting Suu Kyi to China, Beijing may also be sending a signal to the military-backed USDP that it is not the only player China has to depend upon, but if it wants it can make new friends in Myanmar.
Suu Kyi might have also seen the visit as a window of opportunity for her to build ties with the leadership of a powerful neighbour before her party faces the elections this year. If the NLD were to be elected to power, she recognises the significance of China in Myanmar’s foreign policy.
(The writer is a Research Fellow, Observer Research Foundation)

Strategic technology might disrupt India-China status quo



What does the quest by Chinese companies for "top-to-bottom" domination of digital platforms mean for India?
This is the eighth part in the series The China Chronicles.
Read the first seven parts here.

Ant Financial’s (the fintech arm of the Alibaba Group) effort to acquire MoneyGram, one of the world’s leading money transfer companies, reflects China’s naked ambition to control technology ecosystems of the 21st century.
The range of products and services that Chinese behemoths have eyed (and in many cases, acquired) is astonishing. At the time of writing, this author found that Tencent, the Shenzhen-based messaging platform has bought a five percent stake in Tesla, leading many to speculate its plans for the self-driving car market. Last year, Chinese appliance manufacturer Midea announced its takeover of Kuka, a German robotics company that Europe digital commissioner saw as “important for the digital future of European industry.” Brazil’s most successful “online-discount” company Peixe Urbano was bought by Chinese search engine giant Baidu as early as 2014. And finally in 2015, India’s own Paytm ceded a 40 percent stake in Alibaba, China’s biggest e-commerce company.
These instances — a fraction of the global mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals that Chinese companies have driven in the last five years — reveal a trend of strategic acquisition of technologies. They are attempts at vertical convergence and control of digital platforms. For example, by owning or being the dominant stakeholder in an e-commerce company (Alibaba), a payment gateway (AliPay/Paytm) and a money transfer platform (MoneyGram), Ant Financial aims to create an interoperable system that starts with a consumer receiving money in her e-wallet, and ends with her spending it on products anywhere in the world. Its investment in a leading robotics company (Kuka) suggests Midea is betting on an intelligent, Internet of Things driven environment, where “traditional” appliances are seamlessly connected by sensors responding to the needs of their owners. If consumer needs can be gauged without human input or intervention, they can be also be addressed by robots who automate daily tasks like cleaning or cooking. These M&As were likely given green signal by the political leadership in Beijing, given the close ties between China’s internet giants and the Communist Party.
What does the quest by Chinese companies for “top-to-bottom” domination of digital platforms mean for India? In an extreme scenario, Chinese applications and devices could not only become the custodians of Indian users’ data, but also the gatekeepers of security while shaping consumer behaviour. To an extent, this is already the case with four of the top Chinese smartphone models (by market share) in India. The pervasive influence of Chinese technologies is an eventuality of enormous geopolitical significance for New Delhi. Should China gain levers over digital markets, it will mark the second phase of the economic relationship between both countries, heralding a shift from a demand-driven market for Chinese products to being necessity-driven. Needless to say, this scenario will curtail the strategic and military options of India’s foreign policy planners.

The pervasive influence of Chinese technologies is an eventuality of enormous geopolitical significance for New Delhi.

A second and more probable outcome is that New Delhi and Beijing will collaborate to tailor products and services for the Indian market. Current developments reflect the desire on both sides to pursue such efforts. The fourth India-China Strategic Economic Dialogue in October 2016, sought to strengthen cooperation “to take advantage of digitisation in all areas of economy; […] jointly promote manufacturing technology, [promote] cooperation through the partnership of enterprises between the two countries in the area of high performance computing, smart cities [etc.].”
The communique also suggests: “[T]he complementary strengths of India and China in ICT sector, specially computer hardware of China and computer software of India should be leveraged for competitive and economic advantage.”
The goal of producing Indian technological solutions for Chinese platforms is many years away, but there is no doubt that Beijing will have to work with Delhi if it wants to further service India’s platform economy. Security testing of Chinese telecom equipment as well as applications, for instance, will be a sticking point for both sides to resolve at an early stage of talks.
No matter which scenario is realised, technology cooperation will cast away closely held beliefs that currently dictate Delhi’s approach with China.
  • The political relationship will be subsumed by economic factors, prompting Indian regulators to work with their Chinese counterparts to secure the digital economy. As a result, big-ticket, intractable issues like NSG membership or UN Security Council reform may be pushed to the back burner. That is not say such issues will matter less to India’s foreign policy moorings, but their potential to act as a spoiler in India-China ties may consequently diminish.
  • The Chinese private sector will emerge as an influential factor in bilateral ties. While it is true Chinese businesses are connected to the political establishment in Beijing, they are also driven by bottom lines and market shares. As their India operations expand, Chinese companies will exert considerable influence over the CPC, and perhaps even steer the trajectory of the relationship.
  • India and China will likely work together to develop technical standards and protocols for the interoperability of devices and digital platforms in Asia. Asian digital ecosystems are currently fragmented, given that no one company has a monopoly over its infrastructure. As Chinese devices and applications continue to penetrate the Indian market, they will also have to design technologies that address security concerns indigenous to India: vulnerabilities in cheap, handheld devices, the linking of mobile phones to India’s unique identity database, encryption standards for communication platforms, etc. Technology-based cooperation may also spillover into regional cooperation for standard-setting, given that digital economies in southeast and central Asia are booming.
  • Beyond technology standards, New Delhi and Beijing may also be prompted to coordinate national policies on data protection (or at a minimum, compare notes on how best to harmonise them) given the inextricable linkages between Chinese platforms and data from India contained in them. Policy questions addressed may include: What data should remain within Indian borders? What safeguards will apply to data of Indian citizens stored abroad? How can both sides create information sharing channels between Indian and Chinese law enforcement agencies to tackle cyber crimes? Policy coordination is an inherently political exercise, which will require high-level representation, making up for its deficit in current bilateral discussions.
  • Wary of expanding Chinese influence, American and European technology manufacturers and platforms will court the Indian market, offering New Delhi a bargaining chip that could be used for political ends. Currently, Chinese apps do not compete with their western counterparts in many markets, but that is set to change as they turn towards developing English language platforms.

Efforts by Chinese companies to control digital ecosystems in Asia and beyond must wake Indian policymakers up to their worrying consequences.

As digital platforms converge, it would be ill-advised if India ceded space to its eastern neighbour to determine the rules of governance in cyberspace. At the same time, economic and business imperatives driving Chinese companies to India offer an opportunity for New Delhi to bring China to the negotiating table. While China is able to pump money and resources into developing new technologies, their utility and interoperability will be determined by consumers in emerging markets like India. Regulatory norms or technology standards designed to exclude Chinese players can seriously hurt Beijing’s economic prospects, which is a card India should not hesitate to deploy. The negotiation process that follows may ultimately break the political stalemate that the relationship is currently hostage to.