Showing posts with label Regional Parties in India. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Regional Parties in India. Show all posts

Thursday, 30 March 2017

Chinese regional hegemony is a bridge too far

Chinese Hegemony
The National Intelligence Council (NIC) of the United States released its Global Trends report last month. Titled Paradox of Progress, it warns its readers to buckle themselves for an increasingly turbulent future. Much of this turbulence, it argues, would emanate from a phenomenon the world has not seen in at least since the end of the Cold War: hegemonic struggles among major powers. The decline of American power, according to the NIC, is one of the main reasons for such grim prognostication. But so is the possibility of China replacing the US hegemony. In short, the report appears to confirm an already existing impression: that the global liberal order, largely a product of post-Second World War US power, may be short-lived. The most likely casualty of this power shift would be the US hegemony in the Indo-Pacific.
The decline of the US power is arguably manifesting itself in the current inward trend in US foreign policy. The US now intends to tamper down on its commitments to its allies in the Asia-Pacific and is actively encouraging them to bear most of the burden of their alliance commitments. Rather than an active balancer of Chinese power in the Indo-Pacific, the US appears to be moving to a posture of off-shore balancing. Neo-isolationist tendencies in American body politic may further entrench China’s hegemonic role in the region, analysts fear.
Despite a grim perception of a decline in the US power in Asia and China’s rise, it is not readily evident that the regional order in the Indo-Pacific will witness a Chinese hegemony. To achieve regional hegemony, three conditions are necessary. First, a regional hegemon has to effectively control not only the continental sphere of influence but also the maritime domain. Second, regional hegemony requires all possible rivals to be neutralised. Lastly, hegemony must exude a benign character since the difference between hegemony and raw power is one of legitimacy. China falls short in all these categories.
China by its nature has always been a continental power. It is hemmed in by land frontiers from three directions. Some of these are disputed, for example the India-China border. In Central Asia, its intentions to expand its sphere of influence contests with those of Russia. Even when China has pacified most of its territorial disputes, the contestations on the continental front are still active. Moreover, China’s growing dominance in the continental sphere notwithstanding, its maritime frontiers remain far from stable. . China’s maritime presence is restricted by geography itself. Its access to the Pacific Ocean is blocked by a ring of hostile Island Chains. The presence of states such as Taiwan, Philippines, and Japan are natural obstacles to China’s maritime influence. Its access to the Indian Ocean is similarly imperilled by the tyranny of geography especially its Malacca dilemma. However, the real problem for China is the presence of the US Navy and its unparalleled control over Asia-Pacific’s maritime domain. China’s sea denial capabilities in the form of a substantive submarine fleet and anti-access missiles are largely defensive systems which add little to its ability to project power. As David Shambaugh argues, “Chinese military forces still possess no conventional global power-projection capabilities.”  Projection of power demands sea control capabilities: a large fleet of aircraft carriers. With its first aircraft carrier still under development, that is a prospect which will require substantial effort and time. It will also lead to employment of asymmetric warfare against its own sea control assets, as is currently the Chinese strategy towards the US Navy. And even when US may decide to gradually move out of the Indo-Pacific, a remote possibility indeed, China will have to contend other equally capable navies especially with Japan in East Asia and India in the Indian Ocean. China’s prospects of dominating the Asia-Pacific’s maritime domain are therefore bleak. And if the history of great power rivalries has anything to offer for contemporary analysis, no continental power can be a regional hegemon without establishing an absolute control over the maritime domain. That Beijing realises its maritime vulnerability is evident in China’s frantic attempts to get access to the Indian Ocean through land corridors and naval bases, success of which many argue is doomed to failure.
Second, continental powers generate much more friction than maritime powers do. As Edward Luttwak explains in the Logic of Strategy, the rise of Chinese power will automatically generate countervailing balances. Unlike maritime powers which tend to control the oceans and have limited capacity to pursue territorial aggression, continental powers are perceived to be more hostile due to their capability to pursue territorial harm. Balances of power are more frequently achieved against continental powers as against maritime powers. The case of Germany in both First and Second World War is a case in point. But so was the case of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. China’s maritime disputes with most of its neighbours add to this explosive mix. When seen holistically, China’s rise in the region has led to an increase in balancing activity by other states in the region whether big or small. From India to Japan and Vietnam, the region is witnessing a rise in both internal balancing (increasing military expenditures) but also external balancing. The latter is particularly relevant in the strategic interactions between India, Japan, Australia, Singapore, Vietnam and the US. In the Indo-Pacific, China is increasingly been seen as a hostile power, one that might also remain “lonely”.
If China cannot possibly overcome its continental character to transform into a dominant maritime power and its rise would continue to generate more friction with other states, it’s most difficult internal challenge would be to provide a veneer of legitimacy to its growing power. The US hegemony led to the creation of a liberal global order which benefited most states to some extent. The rise of China in the last quarter of a century could not have been possible without the US-led liberal order. Even if the US hegemony was contested in certain quarters, it was also widely accepted because the US could externalise the benefits of its hegemony to other stakeholders, be it through commerce, institutions, rules and norms. China’s message of harmonious development and peaceful rise was a similar attempt to make its rise more acceptable to the broader Indo-Pacific. But China’s behaviour in recent years has, rather than creating additional legitimacy for itself, made other states more anxious. China’s insulated domestic politics is one reason for this anxiety. Unlike democratic powers, lack of transparency in China’s internal politics creates uncertainty about its intentions. This is most obvious in the debate over China’s military spending. China’s one-party rule does not allow any kind of external influence on its domestic policy. It has been suggested by some that the US hegemony was benign particularly because its domestic politics was always influenced by interest-groups representing many ethnicities and nationalities. In China, such external influences are not possible. Finally, if China was to be the regional growth-engine, recent trends suggest that China may not be able to externalise even the economic benefits in the region. The process of de-globalisation will force China to adopt similar neo-mercantilist economic policies. It has already started transforming its export-oriented economy into one which is sustained by internal consumption. For many of Asia’s smaller economies, penetrating Chinese markets therefore would be an increasingly burdensome exercise.
Notwithstanding NIC’s emphasis on the emerging disorder in the region and beyond, Chinese hegemony in the Indo-Pacific appears to be some way off. One may not dispute the decline in American power and more so its willingness to engage in the region, but to suggest that China will automatically replace United States as the regional hegemon is far-fetched. The current strategic flux surely does make the region and the globe more chaotic but it also offers opportunities to other rising powers like India. For one, it provides India greater strategic space which if used judiciously may help in extracting concessions from the Chinese. If history is any guide to Chinese behaviour, the alignment of international politics has always been a major determinant of Chinese behaviour vis-a-vis New Delhi. For example, after the Sino-Soviet clashes of March 1969, India and China began their first dialogue after the 1962 war. By using China’s sensitivity over its perceived vulnerability in a hegemonic contest with the US, India may profit from this strategic flux. It will also allow her to increase its position in the Indo-Pacific’s new regional order and to create substantive partnerships with countries like Japan and South Korea which New Delhi needs for its own economic development. Finally, any rising power like India needs regional followers. As China’s power increases and perceptions of American decline get further entrenched in the region, India’s efforts to mediate and stand for a liberal regional order may increase its influence especially with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. Increasing uncertainty, as the NIC report suggests, brings disorder but such situations also raise the value of key swing states like India. For rising powers, some disorder is also a virtue.

China’s domestic problems need not make us too happy, cautions Shourie

Mr. Arun Shourie, former Union minister and author, thinks that it was time for the India to develop and project itself in consonance with how it wants to be perceived by the world. He said this while delivering lecture on 'Sino-India Relations: The Changing Landscape' at ORF Kolkata.
2015
Sep
23
Arun Shourie, former Union minister and author, delivered a lecture on ‘Sino-Indian Relations: The Changing Landscape’ at ORF Kolkata on 19 September, organised as part of the Distinguished Lecture Series. He stated that it was time for the India to develop and project itself in consonance with how it wants to be perceived by the world.
He pointed out that a constant criticism that India has had to face over many years is that it fails to live up to the commitments made on paper. Because of this, the country loses vital opportunities for building and sustaining constructive relations with other countries, especially with neighbouring ones.
Shourie’s lecture factored in the problems that characterise Sino-Indian relations and the possible ways in which India might address them. He remarked that India should focus within and find ways of strengthening itself, instead of devoting too much attention and time to what is wrong in other countries.
On China, he remarked that the country was going through a great re-adjustment, if not a problem, while transforming itself from an investment-led economy to a consumption-led economy. He cautioned that China’s domestic problem need not make us too happy, for there could be reason for apprehension as well. Faced with an intractable domestic problem, China may well try to redirect popular attention toward a conjured up threat from a neighbour.
Shourie, a reputed newspaper editor, also felt that depending too much on the media for an understanding of what goes on between India and China could be self-defeating, because the media often sensationalises events that require careful consideration and patient handling. He was not willing to accept resolution of problems through agreements, as he believes that bilateral and multilateral agreements are of no use unless the other party knows that violations will have considerable cost.
Shourie argued that for any country, foreign policy is a long drawn out process in which a country gradually and silently creates a strong foundation for claiming authority in the global arena. That is exactly what China has done. From 2008 onwards, China has started to make its weight felt around the region through assertive, even sometimes aggressive, stances. Other countries can learn a lot from the process of China’s rise.
The lecture was followed by observations and comments by discussants.
Gen. Shankar Roychowdhury, former Army chief, highlighted that Zhou En-lai had offered a golden opportunity of dialogue to the-then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, which ultimately did not work out. But he insisted that there is still time to come to a mutual understanding with regard to land borders shared by the two countries and also with regard to maritime issues. He believes that economically, China is a much stronger country. India should boost its own economy and one way of achieving this would be through creating access for Indian manufactured goods in Chinese markets. The speaker felt that it was in the realm of cultural and people-to-people contacts that the two countries were making more progress. The areas in which India and China are in direct competition include Afghanistan and Nepal, where both countries are looking to increase their strategic influence. Tibet and Arunachal Pradesh are also issues that need consideration and resolution. He said India must learn to compete on an equal footing with China.
Manoj Joshi, Distinguished Fellow, ORF, began by remarking that he views Sino-India relations in terms of four C’s – conflict, cooperation, competition and containment. Talking about the first C, conflict, he underscored the presence of Chinese naval vessels in the Indian Ocean on the pretext of countering Somali piracy, which has been non-existent since 2012. This indicates that such presence is aimed at conducting training exercises. He related this maritime concern with China’s interest in the Indian Ocean and its larger policy goals regarding the Maritime Silk Route. He argued that berthing of submarines is more about indicating the presence of that plan than about maintaining maritime stability. On the issue of cooperation, Joshi highlighted the interaction between the two countries in multilateral fora (the BRICS bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and India’s recent membership to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) and in holding joint military exercises. But he said that there remains room for increased cooperation and that China has to play a role in the economic transformation of South and Southeast Asian regions. He added that apart from Zhou En-lai’s offer for dialogue, a similar offer was also made by Deng Xiaoping. India, however, refused both and since 2008 China has maintained that the conditions for those offers no longer exist.
Joshi referred to several factors while talking about competition between India and China, observing that China is in many ways, ahead of India. He drew attention to the recently held military parade commemorating China’s victory in WWII, which saw a massive display of weaponry. With regard to containment, he emphasised that though China claims India is part of US-led attempts to contain it, Chinese containment of India in South Asia via its activities in nations like Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Maldives has been a reality for years.
Responding to the lecture and the ensuing discussion, Ma Zhanwu, Consul General of the People’s Republic of China in Kolkata, said that Chinese foreign policy never aims at seeking hegemony, but takes care of its own territorial, sovereign and developmental interests. Elaborating this point, Ma said that the Chinese diplomats strictly adhere to the five principles of peaceful coexistence. China’s foreign policy goals are peace, development, cooperation and win-win strategy (added recently), he explained. He claimed that the islands in the South China Sea were part of Chinese territory, as has been the case for decades, according to Chinese history. He called for more people-to-people exchanges to strengthen relations between India and China. There are differences between them, but a positive approach would help overcome these differences.
Report prepared by Pratnashree Basu, Junior Fellow, ORF Kolkata.

China Weekly Report | Vol. VII Issue 9

Roundup of the latest developments on China.

0How important is Latin America on China’s foreign policy agenda?

In light of President Xi Jinping’s visit to South American nations of Ecuador, Peru, and Chile, it’s important to ask: how important is Latin America to China’s foreign policy agenda. Read more >


1The SCO Bank should wake India up to the strategic consequences of Chinese capital

Through the proposed creation of the SCO Bank, China has sought to tie its underwriting of economic development in the Eurasian landmass with its strategic goals for the region. Read more >


6Xi Jinping anointed “core” Chinese leader, but his strategy reveals a contradiction

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s penchant for collecting titles is well known. Is his compulsive habit of consolidating control over byzantine organs of the Chinese state in his own hands? Read more >


2Europe warms up to China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ project, raising the stakes for India

OBOR is not a connectivity project, but an arrangement intended to maximise China’s exports, and help Beijing move up the global value chain. Read more >


3What Duterte’s comments mean for the South China Sea dispute, and the Indian position

Were China to continue obstructing India’s entry into the NSG, or tighten its strategic embrace of Pakistan, it is likely India will sharpen its tone on the SCS dispute as well. Read more >


4India needs to find other ways to deal with China

China will continue to push against India seeing the India-US equation and India’s Act East policy as adverse. Read more >


5Paradiplomacy: Can India learn from Macau and China?

Paradiplomacy forms not just a quintessential part of the country’s foreign policy analysis. Read more >


7Should China cozying up to Bangladesh worry India?

India is worried about the bonhomie with Bangladesh, largely due to perception that China’s motivation to engage with India’s neighbour is to pursue its 

Trump’s Taiwan rethink and India

Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s phone call to President-Elect Donald Trump last week triggered uproar in foreign policy circles of China, US & beyond
Taiwan’s first woman President, Tsai Ing-wen’s phone call to US President-Elect Donald Trump last week has triggered a huge uproar in the foreign policy circles of China, United States and beyond. Although Tsai has described the congratulatory call as a mere international etiquette, there’s much more to it than meets the eye.
The 10 minute telephonic conversation has raised eyebrows of foreign policy analysts due to a number of reasons. To begin with, Mr. Trump has annulled the 40 year old diplomatic protocol, and has become the first US President since 1979 to speak with the president of Republic of China (ROC).  The year 1979 was significant as it marked US’ recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the only legitimate government of China.
Second, the issue of cross-strait relations has three dimensions to it. While the US has expressed its official commitment to the ‘One China’ policy, PRC considers Taiwan as a renegade province, President Tsai refuses to recognise the concept of ‘One China’. Last week, while affirming this unprecedented phone call from Tsai, President Trump took to twitter and referred to her as the ‘President of Taiwan’. The usage of the term Taiwan instead of Republic of China, denotes that the incumbent US administration would prefer to view Taiwan as a separate entity and push for the country’s national sovereignty.
Third, regardless of whether the phone call was premeditated or not, this incident will undoubtedly leave a Chinese inkling on Trump’s strategic intentions. To add to it, President Trump’s recent interview to Fox News Sunday, where he has questioned the privileged position offered to the PRC by Washington’s adherence to the ‘One China’ policy and slammed China for issues such as currency devaluation, PRC’s stance in the South China Sea and towards North Korea could further flare up Sino-US tensions over Taiwan.
Fourth, the recent incident is a clear hint at the hardline strategy that will be adopted by the Trump administration towards China. Although the US officially appreciates China’s ‘peaceful rise’, fresh strains in the relationship caused by maritime disputes, cyber espionage and institutions established by the PRC that challenge the Western module of economic governance, have repeatedly brought these dominant powers against each other.  Considering the conservative orientation of Trump and his Republican followers, it is inferable that the new administration would not be as accommodative of China as the liberal democrats were under the Obama administration.  This was fairly evident during Trump’s election campaign when he accused China of being the “the single greatest currency manipulator that’s ever been on this planet”.
President Tsai, on her part, had orchestrated the phone call to Donald Trump to bring Taiwan back on the table.  In July 2016, Taiwan had ‘mistakenly’ launched a supersonic anti-ship missile towards China.  Such sequence of events clearly demonstrates that ROC under Tsai Ing-wen is taking a tough stance in dealing with cross-strait relations. Trump too, is playing the Taiwan card to send a strong signal to the Chinese leadership.
It is interesting to note that this evolving strategic synergy between the US and Taiwan have definite implications for India. Both India and the US are committed to the ‘One China’ policy and China is a common traditional security threat to all the three powers. Since the 1960s, the ‘China factor’ has loomed large in India’s foreign policy owing to an unsettled border, Beijing’s endorsement of Pakistan on issues relating to terrorism and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), China’s move to block India’s bid to secure membership in the NSG, China’s rising footprint in the Indian Ocean Region, and (most importantly) Beijing’s escalating military ties with the nations of South Asia. However, Trump’s unpredictable stance of engaging with Taiwan over a telephonic conversation has laid the roadmap for India to undertake a hardline strategy towards China, with the US support.
Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s phone call to President-Elect Donald Trump last week triggered uproar in foreign policy circles of China, US & beyond
Taiwan’s first woman President, Tsai Ing-wen’s phone call to US President-Elect Donald Trump last week has triggered a huge uproar in the foreign policy circles of China, United States and beyond. Although Tsai has described the congratulatory call as a mere international etiquette, there’s much more to it than meets the eye.
The 10 minute telephonic conversation has raised eyebrows of foreign policy analysts due to a number of reasons. To begin with, Mr. Trump has annulled the 40 year old diplomatic protocol, and has become the first US President since 1979 to speak with the president of Republic of China (ROC).  The year 1979 was significant as it marked US’ recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the only legitimate government of China.
Second, the issue of cross-strait relations has three dimensions to it. While the US has expressed its official commitment to the ‘One China’ policy, PRC considers Taiwan as a renegade province, President Tsai refuses to recognise the concept of ‘One China’. Last week, while affirming this unprecedented phone call from Tsai, President Trump took to twitter and referred to her as the ‘President of Taiwan’. The usage of the term Taiwan instead of Republic of China, denotes that the incumbent US administration would prefer to view Taiwan as a separate entity and push for the country’s national sovereignty.
Third, regardless of whether the phone call was premeditated or not, this incident will undoubtedly leave a Chinese inkling on Trump’s strategic intentions. To add to it, President Trump’s recent interview to Fox News Sunday, where he has questioned the privileged position offered to the PRC by Washington’s adherence to the ‘One China’ policy and slammed China for issues such as currency devaluation, PRC’s stance in the South China Sea and towards North Korea could further flare up Sino-US tensions over Taiwan.
Fourth, the recent incident is a clear hint at the hardline strategy that will be adopted by the Trump administration towards China. Although the US officially appreciates China’s ‘peaceful rise’, fresh strains in the relationship caused by maritime disputes, cyber espionage and institutions established by the PRC that challenge the Western module of economic governance, have repeatedly brought these dominant powers against each other.  Considering the conservative orientation of Trump and his Republican followers, it is inferable that the new administration would not be as accommodative of China as the liberal democrats were under the Obama administration.  This was fairly evident during Trump’s election campaign when he accused China of being the “the single greatest currency manipulator that’s ever been on this planet”.
President Tsai, on her part, had orchestrated the phone call to Donald Trump to bring Taiwan back on the table.  In July 2016, Taiwan had ‘mistakenly’ launched a supersonic anti-ship missile towards China.  Such sequence of events clearly demonstrates that ROC under Tsai Ing-wen is taking a tough stance in dealing with cross-strait relations. Trump too, is playing the Taiwan card to send a strong signal to the Chinese leadership.
It is interesting to note that this evolving strategic synergy between the US and Taiwan have definite implications for India. Both India and the US are committed to the ‘One China’ policy and China is a common traditional security threat to all the three powers. Since the 1960s, the ‘China factor’ has loomed large in India’s foreign policy owing to an unsettled border, Beijing’s endorsement of Pakistan on issues relating to terrorism and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), China’s move to block India’s bid to secure membership in the NSG, China’s rising footprint in the Indian Ocean Region, and (most importantly) Beijing’s escalating military ties with the nations of South Asia. However, Trump’s unpredictable stance of engaging with Taiwan over a telephonic conversation has laid the roadmap for India to undertake a hardline strategy towards China, with the US support.
Second, although Taiwan recognises India as an important constituent of its ‘Go South’ policy, ROC does not feature prominently in India’s Act East policy. India can further embolden its Act East Policy by considering Taiwan as an important partner in Southeast Asia. Trump administration’s robust stand in favour of Taiwan vis-à-vis China hints at an evolving regional architecture, which India and Taiwan must capitalise to bolster their respective positions in the region.
Third, with Democratic Progressive Party presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen’s ‘new southward policy’ in place, India must make efforts to exploit the potential of its economic ties with Taiwan. In 2014, trade between the two countries stood at US$6 billion – a figure much below the actual potential.  The Indian government must display greater pragmatism in responding to Taiwan’s ‘Go South’ policy in order to maximise the opportunity and promote governmental programs such as the Make in India initiative.
With the recalibration of strategic engagements amongst international players alongside an ongoing Sino-US power transition, the regional order at present seems to be in a state of flux,. Indeed it will be interesting to observe the manner in which India capitalises on this opportunity to maximize its position at the global stage

The SCO Bank should wake India up to the strategic consequences of Chinese capital

SCO Bank should be flagged as a competitor to India-led initiatives like BRICS Bank, which may undermine New Delhi’s role as an economic power in the region.
Beijing, November 2016: At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s (SCO) heads of government meet this week in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, China formally proposed the creation of an SCO Bank to promote development and “boost financial cooperation.” The proposal, accepted by the six member group, is significant for three reasons:
First, unlike other financing initiatives in the region where China is involved, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is a security oriented bloc. The Chinese proposal  is interesting because SCO countries are all founding members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as well, raising questions about the additional purpose that the SCO Bank presumably serves. It is unlikely the SCO Bank’s management or lending rates will be any different. But in comparison to the AIIB, Beijing would have considerable flexibility in determining what projects the SCO should fund, thanks to its dominance of the group. Through its proposed creation of the SCO Bank, China has sought to tie its underwriting of economic development in the Eurasian landmass with its strategic goals for the region. The SCO is not ASEAN, but the bloc shares a considerable degree of political and military consensus that would aid the SCO Bank’s decision making process.

Through its proposed creation of the SCO Bank, China has sought to tie its underwriting of economic development in the Eurasian landmass with its strategic goals for the region.

Second, the SCO Bank could quickly emerge as a competitor to the BRICS New Development Bank, given Russia’s immediate interests in its neighbourhood. Pakistan, absent from the BRICS grouping, may attempt to steer infrastructure development through the SCO, sensing an opportunity to participate in regional projects (say, through an extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor). India, along with Pakistan, will join the bloc formally in 2017 but New Delhi would at best be a junior partner in SCO projects, as opposed to the stature it enjoys in the BRICS grouping.
Third, Beijing has made it clear there is “synergy” between the Belt and Road project (OBOR) and the Eurasian Economic Union, and the SCO Bank may be a carrot for Central Asian states that have so far stayed away to sign up to OBOR. Moreover, Moscow had already agreed to formally link OBOR to the EEU. The prospect of the SCO Bank becoming a conduit for Russia-China efforts to jointly project economic power in the EEU will ring alarm bells in Western capitals.

What does it mean for India?

The SCO Bank is another reminder that New Delhi should be sensitive to the strategic consequences of Chinese capital investments in Asia. Political influence that accrues as a result of bilateral investment is only one such consequence. If anything, recent attempts by China to gain clout in Maldives, Sri Lanka and Nepal by investing in massive infrastructure projects have shown the limits of this approach. But, entities like the SCO Bank give Beijing room to link project financing with its Silk Route project, and determine the economic outlook of the region. This is perhaps of most concern to India, given that its service-oriented businesses are competitive at the higher end of the supply chain. Were projects like OBOR or the SCO Bank result in captive markets in Central and South East Asia for Beijing, it will be easy for Chinese companies to move up the supply chain once the base infrastructure has been put in place. At that stage, it may be difficult for Indian businesses to influence investment guidelines, industry norms or standards as they relate to the provision of services.

The Alibaba example

A good example is Alibaba, China’s top e-commerce company. Even as Huawei looks to be the dominant supplier of telecom and ICT infrastructure in the region, Alibaba will likely expand its footprint in Russia and Eurasia this decade. It is conceivable that Alipay, Alibaba’s payment portal, will be promoted as a fast and efficient way of transacting on the internet — after all, the logistics chain would have been set up by China, and most vendors will be comfortable with a Chinese payment gateway. Would Indian vendors, and innovators in financial technology be crowded out of the market as a result? Would China’s dominance of ‘fintech’ systems also allow it to mould encryption and data protection norms in the region? Will Indian services that rely on retail outsourcing find that some markets in Asia have been closed to them even before they enter it?
Alibaba, China, ecommerce, legitimacy, market return, reconcile, reality, trajectory, growth
Courtesy: Alibaba.com via Twitter
These dire outcomes need not come to pass, but Indian policy planners should be mindful of the potential impact of strategic Chinese investments. The SCO Bank should also be flagged as a competitor to India-led or involved initiatives like the BRICS Bank, which may undermine New Delhi’s role as a economic power in the region. This is not say India should stay away from the SCO Bank. Certain realities remain unchanged: China has plenty of money to pass around; Pakistan will attempt to court Beijing as a site for potential investment; and the Russia-China axis will grow stronger in the years to come. India gets little by staying out of the game. Beijing is certainly keen, both for the sake of legitimacy and for sound market returns, to invest in India. Whether those investments should be coupled with a China-India partnership on larger economic projects is for both capitals to decide. India may have to reconcile with the reality that it will not be an equal partner to Beijing in the design of certain infrastructure projects, but there is no alternative to engagement. By staying out of Chinese-led regional initiatives, India loses a crucial opportunity to secure the future of its own businesses and projects in Asia, and indeed, determine the trajectory of growth.
This is the final of the three part series on China’s foreign policy and what its evolution means for India.