Thursday, 30 March 2017

The SCO Bank should wake India up to the strategic consequences of Chinese capital

SCO Bank should be flagged as a competitor to India-led initiatives like BRICS Bank, which may undermine New Delhi’s role as an economic power in the region.
Beijing, November 2016: At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s (SCO) heads of government meet this week in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, China formally proposed the creation of an SCO Bank to promote development and “boost financial cooperation.” The proposal, accepted by the six member group, is significant for three reasons:
First, unlike other financing initiatives in the region where China is involved, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is a security oriented bloc. The Chinese proposal  is interesting because SCO countries are all founding members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as well, raising questions about the additional purpose that the SCO Bank presumably serves. It is unlikely the SCO Bank’s management or lending rates will be any different. But in comparison to the AIIB, Beijing would have considerable flexibility in determining what projects the SCO should fund, thanks to its dominance of the group. Through its proposed creation of the SCO Bank, China has sought to tie its underwriting of economic development in the Eurasian landmass with its strategic goals for the region. The SCO is not ASEAN, but the bloc shares a considerable degree of political and military consensus that would aid the SCO Bank’s decision making process.

Through its proposed creation of the SCO Bank, China has sought to tie its underwriting of economic development in the Eurasian landmass with its strategic goals for the region.

Second, the SCO Bank could quickly emerge as a competitor to the BRICS New Development Bank, given Russia’s immediate interests in its neighbourhood. Pakistan, absent from the BRICS grouping, may attempt to steer infrastructure development through the SCO, sensing an opportunity to participate in regional projects (say, through an extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor). India, along with Pakistan, will join the bloc formally in 2017 but New Delhi would at best be a junior partner in SCO projects, as opposed to the stature it enjoys in the BRICS grouping.
Third, Beijing has made it clear there is “synergy” between the Belt and Road project (OBOR) and the Eurasian Economic Union, and the SCO Bank may be a carrot for Central Asian states that have so far stayed away to sign up to OBOR. Moreover, Moscow had already agreed to formally link OBOR to the EEU. The prospect of the SCO Bank becoming a conduit for Russia-China efforts to jointly project economic power in the EEU will ring alarm bells in Western capitals.

What does it mean for India?

The SCO Bank is another reminder that New Delhi should be sensitive to the strategic consequences of Chinese capital investments in Asia. Political influence that accrues as a result of bilateral investment is only one such consequence. If anything, recent attempts by China to gain clout in Maldives, Sri Lanka and Nepal by investing in massive infrastructure projects have shown the limits of this approach. But, entities like the SCO Bank give Beijing room to link project financing with its Silk Route project, and determine the economic outlook of the region. This is perhaps of most concern to India, given that its service-oriented businesses are competitive at the higher end of the supply chain. Were projects like OBOR or the SCO Bank result in captive markets in Central and South East Asia for Beijing, it will be easy for Chinese companies to move up the supply chain once the base infrastructure has been put in place. At that stage, it may be difficult for Indian businesses to influence investment guidelines, industry norms or standards as they relate to the provision of services.

The Alibaba example

A good example is Alibaba, China’s top e-commerce company. Even as Huawei looks to be the dominant supplier of telecom and ICT infrastructure in the region, Alibaba will likely expand its footprint in Russia and Eurasia this decade. It is conceivable that Alipay, Alibaba’s payment portal, will be promoted as a fast and efficient way of transacting on the internet — after all, the logistics chain would have been set up by China, and most vendors will be comfortable with a Chinese payment gateway. Would Indian vendors, and innovators in financial technology be crowded out of the market as a result? Would China’s dominance of ‘fintech’ systems also allow it to mould encryption and data protection norms in the region? Will Indian services that rely on retail outsourcing find that some markets in Asia have been closed to them even before they enter it?
Alibaba, China, ecommerce, legitimacy, market return, reconcile, reality, trajectory, growth
Courtesy: Alibaba.com via Twitter
These dire outcomes need not come to pass, but Indian policy planners should be mindful of the potential impact of strategic Chinese investments. The SCO Bank should also be flagged as a competitor to India-led or involved initiatives like the BRICS Bank, which may undermine New Delhi’s role as a economic power in the region. This is not say India should stay away from the SCO Bank. Certain realities remain unchanged: China has plenty of money to pass around; Pakistan will attempt to court Beijing as a site for potential investment; and the Russia-China axis will grow stronger in the years to come. India gets little by staying out of the game. Beijing is certainly keen, both for the sake of legitimacy and for sound market returns, to invest in India. Whether those investments should be coupled with a China-India partnership on larger economic projects is for both capitals to decide. India may have to reconcile with the reality that it will not be an equal partner to Beijing in the design of certain infrastructure projects, but there is no alternative to engagement. By staying out of Chinese-led regional initiatives, India loses a crucial opportunity to secure the future of its own businesses and projects in Asia, and indeed, determine the trajectory of growth.
This is the final of the three part series on China’s foreign policy and what its evolution means for India.

China Weekly Report | Vol. VII Issue 5

POLITICS & SOCIETY

China invites journalists to cover political meetings

Invitations have been sent out to journalists from China and abroad to cover two major Chinese political meetings next month.  The fifth annual session of the 12th National People’s Congress (NPC), the country’s top legislature, will open on March 5 in Beijing.  The fifth session of the 12th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the top political advisory body, will open on March 3. A media center for the two meetings will be open from Feb 27, the general offices of the NPC Standing Committee and the CPPCC National Committee announced. Chinese and foreign journalists should submit applications for passes to the media center, while foreign reporters temporarily in China for the “two sessions” should apply to Chinese embassies or visa organizations authorized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Reporters from Hong Kong and Macao should apply at the central government’s liaison offices in the two special administrative regions. Reporters from Taiwan should apply to the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office.
Source: China Daily

Government helps 3.7m workers get unpaid wages

The government helped more than 3.7 million migrant workers get their unpaid wages totaling more than 35 billion yuan ($5.1 billion) last year. However, the long-standing problem of migrant workers failing to get paid remains a difficult issue due to the chaotic construction market and low penalties for breaking the law, officials said. The total of unpaid wages decreased by 16.7 percent compared with 2015, said Wang Cheng, head of labor security supervision at the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. Wage defaults have been a problem in China, especially before Spring Festival, which falls on Jan 28 this year. Migrant workers who fail to get their wages and can’t get back home for the most important festival in China often win widespread sympathy.
Source: South China Morning Post

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

China to sell new short-range missile to foreign countries

China plans to sell to foreign countries its new short-range air to surface missile which can be mounted on drones and is designed for anti-terrorism operations. The China Academy of Aerospace Aerodynamics, the country’s largest military drone exporter by number of products sold overseas, said it recently conducted live-fire tests on the AR-2 short-range air-to-surface missile in northwestern China. The AR-2 is seen as tough competition for US, French and Israeli missiles, state-run China Daily reported on February 3. With a weight of about 20 kilograms and a 5 kilograms warhead, an AR-2 has a maximum range of 8km and a top speed of 735km per hour. It is effective against personnel, armoured cars, houses or bunkers, its designers said.
Source: The Times of India

Pakistan PM hails friendship with China, CPEC

Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said that China and Pakistan are now bonded through ever strong friendship, according to a statement from the Chinese embassy in Islamabad on January 28. On behalf of the people and government of Pakistan, the prime minister expressed his good wishes for the people, leadership and the Chinese government on the advent of new Lunar year being celebrated in China. He also said that the bilateral partnership in the form of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor will prove to be a historical milestone in the Pak-China bilateral relations.
Source: Global Times

ECONOMY

Green bonds take root in China

Green bonds are starting to look like an increasingly attractive investment prospect in China as the estimated costs to clean up the environment and cut emissions mount, increasing the need for environmentally friendly financing plans. Liang Chao, a manager of the investment department of JC Bank, began to take an interest in green bonds in October. Like other commercial lenders, JC Bank, which is based in Shanxi, China’s largest coal-mining province, is considering using green bonds to help companies fund and develop sustainable projects that benefit the environment. In China, “green bonds” refer to debt instruments that allow investors to support environmentally friendly projects that save energy, reduce carbon emissions and cut pollution. Both companies and financial institutions can issue green bonds.
Source: Caixin

China’s manufacturing shows signs of stabilising economy

China’s manufacturing sector has expanded for the sixth month in a row, a sign the economy is stabilizing amid an uncertain global outlook. The country’s manufacturing purchasing managers’ index (PMI) came in at 51.3 in January, 0.1 lower than in December, according to data released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) February 1. A reading above 50 indicates expansion, while below 50 reflects contraction. NBS statistician Zhao Qinghe said the readings in January had remained at a high level since 2012, which pointed to steady expansion of the manufacturing sector. The sub-index for production was 53.1, 0.2 lower than in December, while the sub-index for new orders was down 0.4 to 52.8. Zhao attributed the deceleration of production and new orders to the Lunar New Year holiday, which reduces work days. China reported 6.7 percent GDP growth in 2016, lower than in recent years but within the government’s target range. Zhao noted that the sub-index for the high-tech manufacturing sector had increased by 1.9 to 55.7, remarkably higher than other sectors.

China treads its way to global governance

China treads its way to global governance

Great Wall of China
As China assumes the presidency of BRICS in 2017, the question of Chinese vision of global governance has once again come to the forefront. With the global order undergoing a transformation, China has increasingly enthralled itself in promoting a refurbished global order defined by multipolarity. Essentially, China’s fascination with setting the terms of global governance stems from the country’s political and economic rise and the notion that for long the West has disdained Beijing from the stewardship of global governance norms.
For long, China has selectively used a two-pronged approach of promoting the idea of its peaceful rise alongside its assertiveness through warnings such as “no countries should expect us [China] to swallow the bitter fruit that undermines our sovereignty, security and development interests.” It is within this dynamic of threat, apprehension and suspicion about the evolving Chinese position in international politics that the country has staged itself as an integral part of chief international and regional bodies. In this context Beijing advocates that the country follows international rules, but these rules were formulated about half a century ago with little participation of China and that global governance norms must be modified with changing times. Therefore global governance reforms are of critical importance for the stability of the world order.
Interestingly, China’s vision of global governance dates back to the ancient idea of the tributary system. The tributary system was an asymmetrical and hierarchical order, according to which the Chinese recognized China as the Central Kingdom, located at the center of the universe. The Chinese emperor was identified as the Son of Heaven, who held the Mandate of Heaven and was consequently the legitimate ruler of “all-under-Heaven” (Tianxia).
At present, China seeks active participation in the issue of global governance for a number of reasons, namely reinstatement of its past glory, advancement of the country’s international status, promotion of its soft power diplomacy, reformation of international institutions so that they would in part reflect Chinese interests and preferences and most importantly ensure China more decision-making power in various international institutions and organizations.
To shore up its stature in international politics and consequently its stake in global governance, the Chinese leadership recognizes the importance of the accomplishment of its two “centenary goals” proposed by 18th CPC National Congress (2012), of establishing a prosperous society by 2021 and a modern socialist country by 2049. Thus, it is on the foundation of national rejuvenation that the country seeks to construct its image of a prevailing power in world politics. Consequently, to create an external environment conducive to the country’s ascendance, Chinese President Xi Jinping has emphasized the strategy of neighborhood diplomacy and a new type of major power relationship (xinxing daguo guanxi). China has not only strengthened its bilateral strategic partnerships with countries across the globe but also voiced its opinion on global governance reforms at various multilateral platforms such as BRICS, United Nations (UN), G20, Bretton Woods bodies and the like.
Essentially, the reforms that China insists upon refer to the restructuring of international institutions such as the Bretton Woods bodies (including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In its bid to bring about such reforms, of late China has embarked upon its own process of global institution building. A case in point is the institution of a Silk Road Fund, which seeks to enhance connectivity and trade within the framework of the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road and the Silk Road Economic Belt initiative; the BRICS-led New Development Bank; and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
This commentary originally appeared in Forbes.

The Suu Kyi factor in China’s Myanmar policy

As Myanmar's general elections draws nearer and at a time when China's relations with Myanmar's military-backed government comes under increasing strains in recent months, Beijing seems to be stepping up its multiple-engagement strategy with key political actors to prepare itself for any eventuality post-elections.
As Myanmar’s general elections, slated to be held later this year, draws nearer and at a time when China’s relations with Myanmar’s military-backed government under President Thein Sein comes under increasing strains in recent months, Beijing seems to be stepping up its multiple-engagement strategy with Myanmar’s key political actors to prepare itself for any eventuality post-elections.
Leading a delegation of her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), Myanmar’s opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi is on a five-day visit to China this week at the invitation of China Community Party (CCP). Questions on why the sudden visit or why now and what is the significance of the visit are being raised both inside and outside the country.
Suu Kyi’s visit comes at a time when relationship between the two countries is at its lowest ebb in recent years. Since Myanmar initiated democratic reforms in 2011, Beijing’s influence in Myanmar has been fading in the wake of Naypyitaw’s growing engagement with the West, particularly, the US.
Though China remains the largest trading partner of Myanmar, Beijing has been unhappy with President Thein Sein for the suspension of two major Chinese-backed projects – a cooper mine and a hydro project in northern Myanmar.
Tensions in China-Myanmar ties escalated in the recent months over Myanmar’s army offensives against ethnic rebels along the border involving an ethnic Han Chinese called Kokangs that has resulted in influx of refugees into China’s Yunnan Province and killing of four Chinese citizens in a bombing by Myanmar armed forces that strayed into the Chinese side.
China’s “multi-faceted diplomacy”
Over the past few years since Myanmar’s initiated democratic reforms in 2011, the CCP has been engaging different political parties of Myanmar under its party-to-party exchange with the aim to strengthen ties with key political stakeholders in Myanmar.
During Myanmar’s military-rule, China had to deal with only one political player – the junta. After reforms, Beijing adopted a new strategy to engage all the political actors of Myanmar since in the changed political environment the country has been driven by diverse political forces.
This is Suu Kyi’s first visit to China, but not for her party. In fact, a 12 member delegation that included NLD Central Executive Committee members, NLD member of parliaments and provincial NLD representatives had visited China in May 2013.
In April this year, speaker of Myanmar’s parliament and chairman of the ruling party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), Thura U Shwe Mann visited China and met senior leaders of the Chinese leadership including President Xi Jinping.
According to Xinhua news agency, President Xi called for high-level contacts and personnel exchanges between the CCP and the USDP and discussed Chinese “One Belt, One Road” initiative and the need to maintain border peace during his meeting with Shwe Mann. A proposal for a railway line connecting the Bay of Bengal with China’s Yunnan province has been stalled and Beijing has been pushing for Myanmar government’s approval.
President Xi may have discussed similar issues and called for better party-to-party ties with Suu Kyi during their meeting yesterday. Although there has been no detail about the agenda of the visit, the Chinese leadership might have expressed its desire to see the revival of the suspended projects.
Earlier in April 2013, China hosted a delegation led by Myanmar’s ruling party, which included five other political parties. Interestingly, NLD was not included in that delegation. In the same month, the CCP also invited Rakhine Nationalities Development Party. This is an indication that China is not only cultivating the bigger players but also smaller ethnic political parties.
Another Myanmar political parties’ delegation travelled to Kunming, Yunnan Province in June 2014 at the invitation of the CCP that included leaders from the Arakan National Party (ANP) and the National Democratic Force (NDF).
A common factor in most of these party visits is a stop at Kunming, Yunnan province, where Suu Kyi’s delegation is also expected to visit. For China, Yunnan province is at the heart of its Myanmar strategy. Yunnan province borders northern Myanmar and has huge stake in the overall China-Myanmar ties as it positions itself as the gateway to Myanmar.
Of late, developments along the border have emerged as a source of tension between the two countries due to the conflicts involving Myanmar army and ethnic rebels. From the Chinese perspective, deepening ties between Myanmar’s leaders and the provincial leaders are vital for the two countries and such visits are used to forge better ties and understanding between them.
Suu Kyi and the West
Since Suu Kyi joined politics in the late 1980s. China’s relations with Suu Kyi and her party the NLD has been negligible, particularly owing to the fact that Beijing had engaged the military-government in Myanmar that had imprisoned Suu Kyi for more than a decade.
As China’s ties with Myanmar peaks with the military government, the Western countries imposed sanctions on Myanmar and supported Suu Kyi’s struggle for democracy and human rights and made her a democracy icon.
After her release from house arrest and re-entry in politics, Suu Kyi has visited several capitals in the West, including the US and UK. China has seen these developments with some wariness, particularly because of Suu Kyi’s political stand and her international image which is seen as West-oriented.
Even as Suu Kyi has said on several occasions that China is an important neighbour and that Myanmar needs to maintain good relations with its northern neighbour, Beijing has remained doubtful.
From the Chinese perspective, the current visit of Suu Kyi is a big diplomatic success. Suu Kyi may also consider her visit as a demonstration to the Chinese that she would be willing to work with the Chinese in the future.
The Americans will be closely watching the developments as it would see this as Chinese ability to win over a political player who they expect could push their interests further in the Southeast Asian nation, as its strategic competition with China intensifies.
By inviting Suu Kyi to China, Beijing may also be sending a signal to the military-backed USDP that it is not the only player China has to depend upon, but if it wants it can make new friends in Myanmar.
Suu Kyi might have also seen the visit as a window of opportunity for her to build ties with the leadership of a powerful neighbour before her party faces the elections this year. If the NLD were to be elected to power, she recognises the significance of China in Myanmar’s foreign policy.
(The writer is a Research Fellow, Observer Research Foundation)

Strategic technology might disrupt India-China status quo



What does the quest by Chinese companies for "top-to-bottom" domination of digital platforms mean for India?
This is the eighth part in the series The China Chronicles.
Read the first seven parts here.

Ant Financial’s (the fintech arm of the Alibaba Group) effort to acquire MoneyGram, one of the world’s leading money transfer companies, reflects China’s naked ambition to control technology ecosystems of the 21st century.
The range of products and services that Chinese behemoths have eyed (and in many cases, acquired) is astonishing. At the time of writing, this author found that Tencent, the Shenzhen-based messaging platform has bought a five percent stake in Tesla, leading many to speculate its plans for the self-driving car market. Last year, Chinese appliance manufacturer Midea announced its takeover of Kuka, a German robotics company that Europe digital commissioner saw as “important for the digital future of European industry.” Brazil’s most successful “online-discount” company Peixe Urbano was bought by Chinese search engine giant Baidu as early as 2014. And finally in 2015, India’s own Paytm ceded a 40 percent stake in Alibaba, China’s biggest e-commerce company.
These instances — a fraction of the global mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals that Chinese companies have driven in the last five years — reveal a trend of strategic acquisition of technologies. They are attempts at vertical convergence and control of digital platforms. For example, by owning or being the dominant stakeholder in an e-commerce company (Alibaba), a payment gateway (AliPay/Paytm) and a money transfer platform (MoneyGram), Ant Financial aims to create an interoperable system that starts with a consumer receiving money in her e-wallet, and ends with her spending it on products anywhere in the world. Its investment in a leading robotics company (Kuka) suggests Midea is betting on an intelligent, Internet of Things driven environment, where “traditional” appliances are seamlessly connected by sensors responding to the needs of their owners. If consumer needs can be gauged without human input or intervention, they can be also be addressed by robots who automate daily tasks like cleaning or cooking. These M&As were likely given green signal by the political leadership in Beijing, given the close ties between China’s internet giants and the Communist Party.
What does the quest by Chinese companies for “top-to-bottom” domination of digital platforms mean for India? In an extreme scenario, Chinese applications and devices could not only become the custodians of Indian users’ data, but also the gatekeepers of security while shaping consumer behaviour. To an extent, this is already the case with four of the top Chinese smartphone models (by market share) in India. The pervasive influence of Chinese technologies is an eventuality of enormous geopolitical significance for New Delhi. Should China gain levers over digital markets, it will mark the second phase of the economic relationship between both countries, heralding a shift from a demand-driven market for Chinese products to being necessity-driven. Needless to say, this scenario will curtail the strategic and military options of India’s foreign policy planners.

The pervasive influence of Chinese technologies is an eventuality of enormous geopolitical significance for New Delhi.

A second and more probable outcome is that New Delhi and Beijing will collaborate to tailor products and services for the Indian market. Current developments reflect the desire on both sides to pursue such efforts. The fourth India-China Strategic Economic Dialogue in October 2016, sought to strengthen cooperation “to take advantage of digitisation in all areas of economy; […] jointly promote manufacturing technology, [promote] cooperation through the partnership of enterprises between the two countries in the area of high performance computing, smart cities [etc.].”
The communique also suggests: “[T]he complementary strengths of India and China in ICT sector, specially computer hardware of China and computer software of India should be leveraged for competitive and economic advantage.”
The goal of producing Indian technological solutions for Chinese platforms is many years away, but there is no doubt that Beijing will have to work with Delhi if it wants to further service India’s platform economy. Security testing of Chinese telecom equipment as well as applications, for instance, will be a sticking point for both sides to resolve at an early stage of talks.
No matter which scenario is realised, technology cooperation will cast away closely held beliefs that currently dictate Delhi’s approach with China.
  • The political relationship will be subsumed by economic factors, prompting Indian regulators to work with their Chinese counterparts to secure the digital economy. As a result, big-ticket, intractable issues like NSG membership or UN Security Council reform may be pushed to the back burner. That is not say such issues will matter less to India’s foreign policy moorings, but their potential to act as a spoiler in India-China ties may consequently diminish.
  • The Chinese private sector will emerge as an influential factor in bilateral ties. While it is true Chinese businesses are connected to the political establishment in Beijing, they are also driven by bottom lines and market shares. As their India operations expand, Chinese companies will exert considerable influence over the CPC, and perhaps even steer the trajectory of the relationship.
  • India and China will likely work together to develop technical standards and protocols for the interoperability of devices and digital platforms in Asia. Asian digital ecosystems are currently fragmented, given that no one company has a monopoly over its infrastructure. As Chinese devices and applications continue to penetrate the Indian market, they will also have to design technologies that address security concerns indigenous to India: vulnerabilities in cheap, handheld devices, the linking of mobile phones to India’s unique identity database, encryption standards for communication platforms, etc. Technology-based cooperation may also spillover into regional cooperation for standard-setting, given that digital economies in southeast and central Asia are booming.
  • Beyond technology standards, New Delhi and Beijing may also be prompted to coordinate national policies on data protection (or at a minimum, compare notes on how best to harmonise them) given the inextricable linkages between Chinese platforms and data from India contained in them. Policy questions addressed may include: What data should remain within Indian borders? What safeguards will apply to data of Indian citizens stored abroad? How can both sides create information sharing channels between Indian and Chinese law enforcement agencies to tackle cyber crimes? Policy coordination is an inherently political exercise, which will require high-level representation, making up for its deficit in current bilateral discussions.
  • Wary of expanding Chinese influence, American and European technology manufacturers and platforms will court the Indian market, offering New Delhi a bargaining chip that could be used for political ends. Currently, Chinese apps do not compete with their western counterparts in many markets, but that is set to change as they turn towards developing English language platforms.

Efforts by Chinese companies to control digital ecosystems in Asia and beyond must wake Indian policymakers up to their worrying consequences.

As digital platforms converge, it would be ill-advised if India ceded space to its eastern neighbour to determine the rules of governance in cyberspace. At the same time, economic and business imperatives driving Chinese companies to India offer an opportunity for New Delhi to bring China to the negotiating table. While China is able to pump money and resources into developing new technologies, their utility and interoperability will be determined by consumers in emerging markets like India. Regulatory norms or technology standards designed to exclude Chinese players can seriously hurt Beijing’s economic prospects, which is a card India should not hesitate to deploy. The negotiation process that follows may ultimately break the political stalemate that the relationship is currently hostage to.